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A E K T O N  
In 1943, Kenneth Craik wrote The Nature of Explanation; Wiener, 
Rosenbluth, and Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose and Teleology; and Pitts 
and McCulloch, A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous 
Activity. These heralded the new e ra  in physiological psychology, in  
cybernetics, and in  the theory of automata. Each presents the unity of 
nature unparceled into mind versus matter, o r  pure mathematics versus 
pure physics. But the old schism is reappearing, and in my field the 
theory of automata is becoming a purely mathematical automata theory, 
separate from the biophysics of brains and the engineering of computing 
machines, and both factions indulge in those reductionisms that Donald 
MacKay has christened "Nothing Buttery. Man, viewed as  a finite 
automaton, is neither just the homomorphic projection from a free 
monoid onto a finite monoid or  subgroup with an identity; nor is he a 
mere machine, just matter in motion. He is at  least both, and requires 
fo r  his description a relation systematically excluded in each reduction. 
Unfortunately that relation is triadic, and for such relations we lack, 
even for extensional logic, an effective calculus. For years I have said 
this, and every time I have been asked why I thought it was of any impor- 
tance. Tarski has always agreed with me, and last summer, in 
Jerusalem, he put it even more sharply by saying that we have no effec- 
tive calculus for any intentional relations, M y  friends, whether they 
understand me or  no, insist that I must devote one lecture to making 
clear why such a calculus is necessary and what constitutes intention- 
ality. This is that lecture. 
brain that ink may character?" with the word "Lekttd* 
pansomaticists and would allow no disembodied notions. For them, a 
proposition consisted in three related physicals. 
utterance, the sentence spoken; the second was the physical to which it 
referred, say, the rising of the sun; and the third was something in the 
head like a fist in the hand, the Lekton, or  the 'that which can be said.' 
Theirs was a logic of propositions which may be intended, and it is thi$ 
- 
- 
- - - -  - 
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In Jerbsalem I had answered Shakespeare's questi hat's in the 
Stoics were 
The first was the 
i 
. 
that separates it essentially from its prolific adversary, Aristotlesl logic 
of classes merely existing, by which it was eclipsed for two millennia. 
It was not until the last third of the previous century that Charles Sanders 
Peirce tackled the problem, out-Kanting Kant and out-Hegeling Hegel in 
attacking Aristotelian logic. Peirce noted correctly that there is what 
he called llfirstness.ll This resembles the goal of physics, and is con- 
cerned merely with what is, the mere event. There is "secondness,ll 
concerned with the relation of a proposition to the event proposed, and 
hence capable of two values, either true or false. 
V.hirdness," relating the two and itself, hence triadic. 
was born, the logic of propositions had been rediscovered and was 
rapidly expanding to give us multiple-valued logic, modal logic, and 
modular logic; and, more recently, at Von Neumann's insistence, prob- 
abilistic logic, in which the logical function, not merely its argument, 
is infected with uncertainty. 
the Stoics was lost in the mathematics of the logic. 
and Platonic Idealism, as biology and mathematics, went their separate 
ways, ignoring the Lekton and intentionality. Thirdness w a s  represented 
then only in German Act Psychology, which made intention the defining 
characteristic of psychic activity. 
Gestalt, empty organism, pseudo-pragmatism, and behaviorism, and 
no logician had a look at it. 
Finally, there is 
By the time I 
But, unfortunately, the pansomatism of 
So Naive Realism 
In this country it was run out by 
S o  began the roaring I2O1s, when I came from years of philosophy to 
take my M. A. in psychology. 
by inventing a logic for verbs other than the copulative but to no avail. 
Thanks to Morgan, of f rui t  fly fame, I had a genetic model of information 
flow through ranks of neurons. 
my way through medical school, and was serving as intern and resident 
at Bellevue Hospital with Sam W o r t i s ,  who accused me of always trying 
to write an equation for the brain. 
fo r  the reticular core of the nervous system. 
I had attempted to clear up these questions 
I had turned to neuroanatomy, ground 
That is what I am still trying to do 
Then the world changed suddenly. Akermann arithmetized logic, one 
of my friends at the Bell Telephone Laboratories produced a measure 
of information, and, to top it all, Larry Kubie invented reverberating 
nervous activity. My thecry of nervous nets computing through ranks of 
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neurons could not cope with this, and it had to wait another dozen years 
for Pitt’s help. The “Depressiontt hit, and in 1932, I went to the Admis- 
sion Service of Rockland State Hospital, where I ran into Eilhard von 
Domarus, the only other trained philosopher I have ever known who was 
forced into neuropsychiatry by philosophic problems. We struclr a bar- 
gain, he to teach me psychiatry and I to help him put the ideas of his 
thesis into English. 
you that the ideas, with the exceptions he notes, were his own. I know 
it, for I disagreed with him concerning Aristotle, Aquinas, Bruno, phys- 
ics, logic, and probability. Nevertheless, I did reduce to English, at 
least partially, his monstrous sentences without losing his ideas. With 
h i s  permission I used this text in teaching for 1 1  years a s  a prof, nssor 
of psychiatry, with all my students in the field who were not incompetent, 
frightened or perverse. 
think it useful to his fellow scientists. 
I know of no other text that so clearly se t s  forth the notions needed for 
an understanding of psychology, psychiatry and finite ‘Automata.. . 
For over a year we battled nightly. Let me assure 
I have h is  permission to publish it whenever I 
This is the proper occasion, for  
Eilhard von Domarus is dead. He hated solemnity, and in his most 
seripus moments made every point with a ponderous joke. His Excellency, 
Wilbur Cross, Governor of Connecticut, said that any formal dinner was 
tolerable i f  he could have Domarus for a seatmate, II.. . for he always 
furnishes you with an argument and Heaven help you if you do not under- 
stand him when you laugh.” 
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'THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND 
PREFACE 
N o  book can be understood or  evalqted apart from its origin and func- 
tion in the development of human life. 
language in which it is written. 
and current symbolic association of its words with particular things. This 
preface is designed to relate this inquiry to the world of thoughts and things. 
Aristotle and Hegel habitually prefaced theoretical discussions by state - 
ments intended to relate the argument through language to the experience 
of the reader. They 
thought first of experience. Analysis of that experience created abstrac - 
tions, which they never mistook for the concrete. 
this thesis, which is basically Aristotelian in relation to fact and Hegelian 
in development presumably because biology was my first concern in school, 
and dialectics, my avocation during the war ,  
It exists a s  a small  sample of the 
Its meaning depends upon the traditional 
This they did because they were concrete thinkers. 
This is important in 
Every philosopher knows that it is sheer presumption for any man to 
call his ideas his own. 
on the anatomy of the brain, I might never have become interested in how 
the nervous system arose o r  what function it served. Having worked with 
him I could neither forget it no r  be content with it alone. To him psychol- 
ogy and psychiatry were studies of its most complicated manifestations in 
health and disease. This brought me to Kraepelin and classic psychiatry, 
which I studied with Berger, Birnbaum, Bumke, Bostroom, Kahn, Hoche 
and Westphal. 
kept me in constant contact with the insane, convinced me of the applica- 
bility but inadequacy of that psychiatry. There was in theory one gross 
hiatus, bridged only in practice with the patient., The attempt to under- 
stand that bridge gave rise to  the present inquiry. 
be sought in  the nature of experience itself. 
and turned to  Husserl for phenomenology. 
is greater than appears in this thesis. 
clarified f o r  me the notion of transcendentality in terms of intention. 
account of his teaching my study in psychology began, though it did not end, 
Had it not been for Kuhlenbeck, with whom I worked 
Those seven years in Germany, during which hospital work 
The way in which the question arose suggested that the solution was to 
I was at the time in Freiburg 
My personal indebtedness to him 
He was concerned with mentality and 
01 
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with the writings of Bretano. Hence the chapter on the Sciences of Illinti. 
But the bridge, so defined, was not substantial. What was requisite was  
a theory of knowing. I came to Northrop for the philosophy of science. His 
chief interest was in understanding the known in terms of how that known 
arose and of how knowledge of it was systematized in terms of logical r e l a -  
tions. Through him I became acquainted with the work of Whitehead and 
the development of mathematical physics. Hence the chapter on the Sciince 
of Matter. While studying with Northrop the problem of understanding 
as of ontological importance, particularly in biology, became clear to 
me. At his suggestion I wrote this thesis as a dissertation present2d 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University. 
The nature of the bridge was  now clear, but the notions seemed too ,:en- 
era1 for application in psychiatry. I spent the ensuing year with Heideg*?er 
studying hermeneutics, the problem of being and becoming for man, or ,  of 
how the way in which we heed the world determines what is there for us; He 
was lecturing on Aristotle and explained the metabasis eis aUo genos, which 
is the shift in kind of being undergone by certain entities, as dependent upon 
a shift in the way we heed those entities. The exposition of "Mindingw shows 
my indebtedness to him. 
Jasper 's  contriloution. 
as outline for a course on the Philosophy of Mind. 
In 1932 I retc-ned to the study of the insane at this hospital and met 
McCulloch who has worked with me for more than a year at the present 
formulation of the thesis. 
ogical approach to the processes responsible for anticipation, purpose, 
thought and speech and in the product of these processes; specifically, in 
I 
I 
It was  he who emphasized to me the quality of 
At this stage of its development the thesis served 
His chief interest has been in the neurophysiol- 
the propositions of fact and sentiment. The central problem for him is how 
organisms may be affected so that new propositions a r e  induced. Through 1 
i him I became acquainted with Pike and the theories of Hughlings Jackson; with him I elaborated the theory of mMattering.M 
Though the dialectical development of this theory was Hegelian, the ana- 
lysis of experience and its relation to fact i s  Aristotelian. For the thesis , 
the facts of importance were, and a re ,  particular experiences with particular 
patients. My greatest obligation remains to them a s  the origin and final 
test  of the theory presented in  this book. 
E. v.D. 
Orangeburg, N. Y. 
March 1934. 2 
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INTRODUCTION 
Men go mad. In the sixteenth century wordy Polonius attempting to 
say what constituted madness was brought abruptly to  the conclusion that 
it was to be mad. 
The problem is fourfold. Sociologically it is to  prevent alienation and to 
reconcile the alienated. 
heal the insane. 
the mad men entrusted to their care. 
priests rather than physicians and their descriptions a r e  consequently in 
te rms  of crime and sin rather than of disease. 
and Sigmund Freud on hysteria present belated punitive and demonological 
procedures. The problem of psychiatry remains unaltered. The practice 
proves it unsolved. 
Psychiatry has attacked this matter with more manner. 
Psychologically it is to  preserve sanity and to 
The solution was first attempted by those who described 
These keepers were jailors and 
The writings of Rosanof 
During the last century physicians, trained in science, initiated the 
dispassionate observation of patients. 
ical approach which has yielded valuable information. 
prematurely cast into heuristic systems no one of which has survived its 
decade without destructive qualification. 
much that wi l l  be of use  in scientific psychiatry. 
This w a s  the beginning of the empir- 
But the findings were 
Yet this procedure has disclosed 
At present, on account of the development of sociology and physiolozy, 
the study of mental life as psychiatry and psychology is expanding rapidly. 
But progress requires the assumption of an analytical attitude compara d e  
to  that in other fields of science. 
In order to  formulate the concrete problem psychiatrists must consider 
the man a s  a member of society and as a society of members. 
the psychiatrist is content with empirical procedures cross -classifications 
will exist. 
iological psychology still progress in the main independently. 
each there is the norm, the disease and the cure. 
sible in a scientific procedure of psychology o r  psychiatry. 
be founded on a conception of causation limited in no final sense by the man 
either as the ultimate unit of the social system o r  as the ultimate system 
of physiological units. What is required is a science of mind and matter 
transcending the man. These must be studied in their normal and abnormal 
As long as 
The science of alienation from society and the study of the phys- 
In terms of 
Such multiplicity is lmpos- 
For this must 
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manifestations. Only on such knowledge can a rational therapy be founded. 
This science must be experimental; that is ,  methodologically, it must 
be reasoning from facts to hypotheses submitting to the test of experience. 
The rational process is the same, no matter what is considered. Each 
science is a limitation to particular phenomena and their complex relations. 
The reasoning employed is usually correct when the notions are applicable 
and adequate to the facts, and the facts a r e  the facts. However impeded 
and bewildering the process in the field of psychiatry, the approach is 
basically the same a s  in all other sciences. 
Every science ar ises  in a world possessed of metaphysical presuppo- 
sitions not explicitly assumed but subsumed in the relations of its requisite 
symbols which constitute the systematic context in which each symbol is 
significant. Each metaphysic is largely determined by the notions previously 
used to  explain the known world. With increase'of know1edge:the old symbol6 
become inadequate for prevalent distinctions, and the systematic context 
eventually insures the inapplicability of the notions themselves. 
of fact. 
specific aspects produces a limitation in the discourse which does not corre- 
spond to a limitation i n  the universe. The history of the physical sciences 
and psychology shows a slow drift  toward the problem of the full concrete- 
ness of experience. This is exemplified in the following chapters in which 
we will  consider the effect of earlier metaphysics on subsequent sciences 
in order to do justice to the work that has been done and, at the same time, 
to show the concepts of mind and matter, explicit in modern physics and 
implicit in modern psychology. It is only by a comparative study of meta- 
physics and sciences that we can hope to show how these relations, implicit 
in these conceptions of mind and matter,  transcend the mindividua1.w Without 
these we would be limited to some metaphysic comparable to Comtian Pos- 
itivism which proved a stumbling block to biology and a stone-wall to psychol- 
ogy. 
Each science is concerned with experience by restriction to  some aspect 
Facts a r e  inherently concrete in experience, so restriction to 
The difficulty was not with the facts. 
For  all  of u s  facts a r e  given. We analyze them into entities called 
relata which must be synthesized in manners determined by the analysis 
if that synthesis is to reproduce the original. The manners a re  called 
relations. Ey one mode of analysis things appear a s  relata requiring mental 
and material relations to reproduce experience. By an alternative mode 
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of analysis mind and matter appear as absirzct relata concrete in the things 
of experience. 
tion; matter subsumes the material relations cz-lled !mssage and extension. 
We are concerned with the sort  of entities which a r i se  when both modes of 
analysis a r e  applied to the same facts. 
Mind subsumes the mental relations called idea and inten- 
- Our primary concern is with psychology and ~6ycniatry.  
, We intend to  demonstrate the ontological significance of such entities only 
in s o  far as they are responsible for the logical structure of mind. 
The difficulties which w e  encounter are inherent in the complexity of 
the problem, for these a r e  the most obvious examples of experience--the 
concrete ! 
all experience; and no system of notions, however symbolized, can appear 
adequate if  it fails to  exhibit the concreteness of experience of each in terms 
of the other. 
iences the world as matter and can neglect all mind save his awn. 
esponding simplicities arise for the mathematician because his discourse 
is limited to  idea and intention and he can neg’lect all matter save his own. 
Yet the history of both physics and mathematics shows that the only escape 
from an antiquated metaphysic is into the metaphysic subsumed by the sys-  
tematic context of the symbols requisite to  convey experience in its achieved 
distinction.. 
The psycholozist and h i s  subject, the psychiatrist and his  patient, 
Certain simplicities arise for  the physicist because he exper- 
Cor- 
In the so-called mental sciences the necessity of this process becones 
obtrusive. Chapter One is the description of it as obvious in psychology; 
Chapter Two, of its subtle appearance culminating in explicit formulation 
in physics. 
for  the symbols Mind and Matter. 
abstrata analyzing all entities concrete in experience. 
on account of the givenness of fact, neither can be supposed without the 
other. ,Chapter Three relates these notions so  a s  to formulate, symbolically, 
Minding and Mattering as exhibited in the development of propositionalizing 
issuing in the lozical structure of mind. 
These chapters a r e  intended to provide the systematic conlext 
The notions intended a r e  conjugate 
They are such t ?at, 
_.- 
---... 
This is only an introduction, 
but to  state what w e  hope to  explain. 
It is not intended tQ discourage the reader, 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SCIENCES OF MIND 
ARGUMENT. When men begin to think, they think about thugs. They 
do not separate the things from the doings , havings , seemingcr o r  meanings 
of the things. 
with its roots, t runks ,  limbs, branches, leaves; one with the kind of t rze  
that it is, a s  an oak o r  a pine or an olive; one with its significance a s  
shelter, shade and harvest. 
relate separate things that these four aspects appear to the thinker as 
entities which he may consider by themselves. 
founded the thinker was this: That of which he wanted to think was not a 
thing, hence he could not imagine it. 
attend to these relations without mistaking them for things. 
The grammar of a l l  languages bears out this assertion. Doings a re  
originally represented by verbs, havings by prepositions, seemings by 
adjectives, and meanings by conjunctions; but that of which one speaks 
is represented by a noun. A s  language 
evolves it becomes possible t o  indicate anyone of these four by a noun 
derived from some other part of speech, but a l l  such words have a tran- 
scendental quality too abstract fo r  the practical man, We a r e  concerned 
with a theoretical problem and must, for the sake of clarity, define four 
terms thus:l( (1): "Fassage" will stand for that which is common to the meaning 
of all ordinary transitive verbs. 
verse. 
explicit o r  conveyed by prepositions o r  the tense of verb-. 
extension together constitute the material relations of things. (3)  'IdeiL" 
wil l  stand for that which is common to the meaning of all  ordinary adjec- 
tives. 
in experience. 
to that of which it is the symbol, whether explicit o r  conveyed by conjunc- 
tions or  changes in the mood of the verb. Idea and intention together con- 
stitute the mental relations of things. 
exhipited in any one complete human proposition. 
The t ree  is one witin its growing, budding, branching; one 
It is only when thinking evolves enough to 
The difficulty which con- 
Few men have ever been able to 
That is the name of the thing, 
Severally, it is the becoming of the uni- 
(2) "Extension" will stand for the relation of whole and part, whether 
Passage and 
Generally it is the likeness of things and, therefore, identity with- 
(4) "Intention" w i l l  stand for the relation of the symbol 
A l l  four relations can usually be 
I WROTE THIS PARTICULAR SENTENCE THAT YOU SEE A COM- 
PLETE PROPOSITION ON THE PAGE BEFORE YOU. 
6 
i 
(1)  The verbs, WROTE and SEE, exemplify passage. They exhibit 
the universe as altered. 
material consequences of my neural processes. 
neural processes a s  material consequences of the marks on the paper. 
The first created the marks on the paper as 
The second creates your 
(2) Extension is exemplified in the prepositions, O N  and BEFORE, 
and in the change of tense of the verb from WROTE (past) to SEE (present). 
In both cases they show, in the relation of where and when, that the par- 
ticular accurrpnce; can be regarded as parts of a more inclusive occur- 
rence; but the change in tense is related to the temporal parts in the whole 
event, whereas the prepositions a r e  related to the spatial parts of that 
same event. 
(3)  Idea is exhibited in the adjective, THIS, PARTICUIAR and COM- 
PLETE. Each exhibits the universe as qualified in experience. This 
indicates identity itself in the demonstrative form; PARTICULAR, as E. 
specific one of many; and COMPLETE, as exemplifying all four entities. 
(4) Intention is exhibited in the conjunction, THAT, and in the change 
of the mood of the verb from WROTE (indicative) to SEE (subjunctive). 
Both exhibit the present occurrence a s  proposed in the original occurrence. 
Here there appears a separation in time and space, s o  that the subordinate 
clause expresses the purpose of the activity of the principal clause; naniely, 
that you see it. 
existed for it only in intention. 
My neural process anticipated your neural process wh..ch 
This argument is basically Aristotelian, though the concepts have 
undergone centuries of clarification, and the proposition is not of the 
type that he attempted to analyze. 
oi things and in our proposition the things a r e  represented by nouns ancl 
pronouns: I,  SENTENCE, EXAMPLE, YOU. These words stand for 
things related by passage, extension, idea and intention; and we know 
that by an alternative mode of analysis the things themselves possess 
passage, extension, idea and intention; that is, the sentence was  written 
and it endured (passage), in time and space (extension), but it w a s  just 
that particular sentence (idea) which might equally well have appeared in 
other ink on other paper and even in another language, and what was  
meant by that sentence was the sentence itself a s  an example of the coni- 
plete proposition (intention). 
He was concerned with the relation 
Psychology sprang from Arisiotie's anaij sis. 
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It was he who made possible the distinction between the sciences of miiid 
and of matter. 
ASSOCIATIONALISM. When Aristotle spoke of the Association of 
Ideas, he was concerned with those more primitive "Ideas" which a r e  
primarily images of things. 
cognizant of their transcendental aspect, their transcendent relation to 
other things, whether these other things were themselves images o r  
originals. 
English philosophy, through Locke, Berkeley and H u e ,  robb--.d the notion 
of an "Ideal1 of all  transcendentality. 
chology at  inception was how "Ideas" so conceived could be associated. 
Mind for these psychologists was at most a collection of these "Ideas." 
Scientists of that day were acquainted with the discipline of physics 
When he spoke of them as  things he was  
Hobbes took these relations for granted; but the tradition of 
The problem that confronted psy- 
and attempted to  handle the "Ideas" of their day as physical things. 
totle had given four laws for the association of "Ideas": Similarity, dis- 
similarity, continuity and contiguity. Associationalism began with the 
realization that dissimilarity was only a special case of similarity, no 
two things being seen a s  dissimilar unless in other respects they were 
similar. A second simplification arose because continuity and contiguity 
could be conceived a s  mere togetherness in experience. This temporo- 
spatial togetherness made it possible for the psychologist to investigate 
the relating of "Ideas11 a s  the physicist had that of the original things; but 
of similiarity and dissimilarity they could make no use until Mi l l  was 
able to subsume them in the correct but paradoxical statement that those 
entities a r e  similar for u s  which did occur together in experience. This 
hypothesis reduced associationalistic theory t o  the hypothesis of physical 
togetherness. 
of the impression to the proof of the trace a s  retention, recall  and recog- 
nition. 
A r i s -  
It was then possible to  investigate learning from the ma-.ting 
In the meantime there had appeared the discipline of statistics in biology. 
It was now possible to count the number of times, and to  evaluate the 
recency of the particular togetherness requisite for  a given learning by 
an individual or  by a group of one o r  of many of these associations of 
ideas. 
o r  frequency was operative. It was called intensity. A mechanical analogy 
The results were not entirely orderly. Another factor than recency 
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for the learning process was then conceived. 
the brain was a mountain-side; for  experience, a shower of rain; and for 
learning, the erosion of the former by the latter. 
sity could not be quantified, a s  recency and frequency, in terms of the 
stimulus alone. Mountain-sides were not of homogeneous material or 
uniform contours. They exhibited not merely passive variation but 
active interference determining the rain. 
physical theory without physical investigation within the organism, and 
induced many associationalists to develop pseudophysical systems o r  to 
give up psycholo,T for  physiology.. 
The conceptual model fo." 
Unfortunately, inten- 
This prevented a satisfactory 
GESTALT. To understand the greatest of these pseudophysical 
systems, one must remember that the majority of the thinking world has 
become permeated by Comtian Positivism. In it there is no room for 
idea and intention. In te rms  of it no mental problem can be stated, far 
less can it be analyzed. Mind enters such a scheme sub rosa; but it is 
the very limited mind of the scientist of that day restricted to  psycho- 
logical insignificance by the attempt to  define the universe in terms of 
the physical relations of things; that is, in terms of passage and extension. 
This period presents (the most grandiose development of Materialism. 
Physicists had had unprecedented success in predicting and controlling 
al l  systems for which they could form mathematical propositions without 
ever becoming aware of the transcendental relation of their propositions 
to  the systems proposed. 
tems had produced great advances in the analysis of organic pmkdems, 
Vitalism, as an explanation of the organic world, was losing ground to  
its prolific adversary. 
in physics and in the physical approach toward biological problems, 
occupied the chair of Hegel. He initiated a psychological school which 
is founded on an oversimplified statistical concept of physico-chemical 
processes mistaken for biological processes to the physical aspect of 
which they a re ,  as stated, inapplicable. He regarded the organism, 
particularly the cerebral cortex, as a physico-chemical system in equilib- 
r ium, the new equilibrium differing from the old only in  the distribution 
Physico-chemical investigations of living sys - 
At this time there appeared Wolfgang K6hler who, with a reputation 
9 
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of stres:, and strain in it. 
of s t ress  and strain in such a system. 
Psychology was f o r  him the study of the pat-ern 
This psychology has one charp-cteristic advantage over older forms 
of Associationalism in that it can symbolize the appearance of a new 
pattern, o r  idea, in a given perception, this pattern, o r  idea, having 
been absent in  the presence of the component parts separately. 
integrals which a re  not to be got at by the addition of sensations. 
these ideas, o r  Gestalten, seen a s  patterns of s t ress  and strain, correspond, 
although only in a purely material fashion, to their  originals external to 
the ori;:”uiism. 
It yields 
Thus 
In az much as  his fundament1 conceptions were static, for the dynamic 
equilibrium was considered as having oeen reached, Gestaltpsychology 
was limited t o  the description of concurrent phenomena with little or  no 
possibility of exposing the problems of ontoseny or phylogeny, disease o r  
decay. 1i1 it the Hegelian movement found its dialectical antithesis exem- 
plified in  the failure to realize the mental significance of such a materi- 
alistic abstraction from concrete experience. 
REFLEXOLOGY. We have now to return from the pseudo-physical 
systems to physiology. 
physioloa,  in particular neurophysiology, began with the discovery by 
Magendi a ~ i d  formulation by Bell of the law that impulses enter the spinal 
cord by the dorsal roots and emerge by the ventral roots. 
0 m e w  rapidly a s  to specific paths extant and operative within the central 
nervous syrtem. It was soon apparent that this was the great coordinating 
mechmism relatin2 muscular and glandular responses to all  external, and 
most internal, stimulation. Comparative study in neural anatomy revealed 
a fundamental unity of structure within the vertebral  phylum modified 
continucuF1y froill lower to  higher forms by an increase in the volume and 
complexity of the dorsal portion, always more and more expanded and 
elaborated at the cephalic end. 
It w a s  in the middle of the last century that 
Knowledge 
But certain of the early thinkers about the function of the nervous 
system were dominated by their antipathy to  the notion of evolution. 
order to  defend the thesis of separate creation, they presumed that each 
structure retained its function, no matter what new structures were added. 
And each new structure corresponded to a new iunction added by God. 
In 
. 
A fish has no cerebral cortex. In order to explain why a man without 
a cortex was  not a fish, but merely a spoiled man, they invented "inhi- 
bition," inhibitorische Fernwirkung, whereby destructions of the cortex 
became responsible for the fa i lure  to find the behavior of the fish in the 
decorticated man. 
It has been possible to demonstrate that each receptor, or sense 
organ, is connzcted to all effectors, or muscles and glands, by an ever 
increasing number and complexity of neural paths. A second great 
generalization of neural activity was necessary to  explain why a man on 
whose nose a fly lighted does not immediately suffer a grand mal convul- 
sion terminable only by death. This is the law of the summation of stimuli: 
Impulses from more than one source are usually requisite for a disturbance 
to  proceed from receptors to effectors through the central nervous system. 
This insures that to  every increase in the complexity of structure, where- 
by disturbances from many sources are redistributed, there corresponds 
a greater differentiation of activity. The continuity of the nervous system 
insures integration. 
Early attempts to localize function failed, chiefly because the functions 
More recent investigated did not correspond to  gross anatomical entities. 
attempts have failed chiefly because of failure to take account of the tem- 
poral extension of the disturbance progressing through the central nervous 
system. 
Clinicians correlated the loss of specific responses with the destruction 
of particular portions of the nervous system and supposed the function lost 
t o  be that of the tissue lost, instead of realizing that all they knew was that 
the remaining functions w e r e  functions of the remaining structure. 
might caricature this oy saying that stereoscopic vision w a s  the function 
of the right eye because d man who lost his right eye lost stereoscopic 
vision. 
ception of what they did actually know. Now return to  the caricature. 
Suppose that we had seen patients who had lost stereoscopic vision by 
loss of the right eye and attributed that function to that eye, and then 
had a patient who had lost a left eye; we might now explain his loss of 
stereoscopic vision by supposing that the destruction of his  left eye, by 
inhibitorische Fernwirkung, prevented his right eye from functioning 
We 
The notion of inhibition, or neural shock, prevented a clear con- 
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stereoscopically, And, a s  if this had not been enough, the gratuitous 
hypothesis of the vicarious assumption of function obfuscated all issues. 
We have discovered that the right eye gave stereoscopic vision and the 
left eye plain vision; but in our patient who had lost his left eye the right 
eye vicariously assumed the function of plain vision. This completes the 
caricature. 
A few men such as Hughlings Jackson, von Monakow, Head, Pike, 
and Herrick have made a consistent attempt to  think through the function 
of the nervous system without resort to inhibition, shock, vicarious 
assumption of function o r  hypotheses ad hoc. They have succeeded 
sufficiently to  show that the way from philosophy to  neurophysiology 
is difficult, but the way from neurophysiology to philosophy is easy. The 
reason for  this is that the phenomena with which they are concerned include 
thinking itself. 
The clinician's use of the conception of the reflex, as an entity defined 
by stimulus and response, was determined by the clinical association of the 
loss of that reflex with the loss of a particular path through the central ner- 
vous Bystem. 
conception of the reflex failed to  include the contributions from all other 
parts of the nervous system to the activity in question as well as the con- 
tribution to all other parts of the nervous system by the activity in question. 
Reflexology arose from the acceptance of necessary for sufficient relations 
of structure to  function. 
the behavior of the organism stated inadequately as the sum of these reflexes. 
It w a s  discovered that while certain r e f l a e s  were occurring others could not 
be elicited. Inhibition was  called upon, as the deus ex machina, to explain the 
findings. Instead of discovering what was  actually occurring in the central 
nervous system, reflexologists were content t o  suppose that one process 
forbade the other; and this, though the receptors and effectors, the afferents 
and efferents, and the necessary shortest anatomical paths through the ner-  
vous system had no parts in common. Inhibition in this sense is an inhihitorische 
Fernwirkung which travels about in the central nervous system where physio.- 
logical experimentation discloses stimulation. 
The reflex was said to be the function of that path. Such a 
Innumerable specific reflexes were defined, ard 
J. B. Watson and Pavlow laid the foundation of a psychology from which 
not only thinking but mind itself is excluded. 
In the Watsonian scheme this is achieved by the substitution of 
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innumerable reflexes, parallel o r  chained in temporal order,  augmenting 
o r  inhibiting one another but devoid of sub- and superordination. Nothing 
happens within the central nervous system except the connection of 
afferents to  efferents,. a change in the connection being produced only 
by new stimulation from without the central nervous system. Such an 
alteration of reflexes so conceived would be,a vicarious assumption of 
function. 
Pavlow has achieved the same end by other means. He has explained 
his invaluable experiments on learning by inhibitions and the inhibitions 
of inhibitions to the third and fourth generation. 
From the day of Hughlings Jackson to the recent work of Head clinicians 
have never been as far from the truth as that. They have always known 
that propositionalizing occurred in the nervous system. Injuries to the 
cerebral  cortex were frequently localized by the quality of the defect of 
that function. 
w e r e  associated with marked aberrations in the desires of their patients 
for food, sleep, sex, exercise, etc. 
They knew also that pathological changes in the diencephalon 
Propositionalizing and affective and emotional relations found no 
adequate explanation in the new psychology to  which two new concepts 
w e r e  added, namely insight and emotional congruity. These were the 
last hypotheses ad hoc of Associationalism and seem strange in their new 
context. 
investigated. 
things matter to it. 
Each is a recognition of transcendent relations of the organism 
The first, that the organism minds; and the second, that 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Reflexology in the form of Watsonign 
behaviorism and Pavlow's conditioned reflexes served psychology in 
two ways: Firstly, in making clear to the psychologist that it is necessary 
for him to study the phenomena and state observations accurately with 
respect t o  passage and extension. Secondly, they have shown such a pro- 
cedure to  be inadequate, differing only privatively from physiology. Thus, 
though behaviorism, o r  reflexology, might describe the material relations 
within and without the organism, it can not describe the mental relations. 
This having been clarified, men with an appreciation of the concreteness 
of experience, born o r  trained philosophers, could not be conciliated by 
the addition of the concepts of intuition and emotional congruity to  
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But to understand the new departure we must return to the beginninzs 
of sociology in Hobbes I - Leviathan. ___ 
w a s  the man among men. His mind was not an aggregation of things, called 
lVIdeas," which failed to  transcend him; nor a complicated pattern of s t ress  
and strain corresponding in a purely material fashion to what had happened 
beyond him; nor the sum o r  difference of reflexes, parallel o r  chained. 
This man minded the world, and the world mattered to him. That is, he 
was in the world and of it. He knew his world 
of men; and they, him. Like most of the men of his generation, the world of 
which Hobbes thought and spoke was  the world of men who thought and spoke. 
They formed propositions and acted accordingly, thus generating society. 
Sociology, like medicine, never altogether lost track of mind o r  of matter. 
- ' J t  it was  not concerned with the correlative nature of those abstractions. 
It had no wgy of Mentalism o r  of Materialism, and it was  too far from a 
science .o be snared by Comtian Positivism. 
The unit of sociological investigation 
It changed him; and he, it. 
- 
There a r e  two languages: That of the mechanic, concerned with the 
passage and extension, accurate to the thousandth of an inch; and that of 
the politician, concerned with idea and intention, significant in the fate of 
nations. 
states. 
their relation. 
Both are of importance in the organization of men into guilds and 
The sociologist could not ignore either language, but he could ignore 
Social psychology, in common with sociology, has this advantage o re r  
antecedent psychologies, that it includes idea and intention as  such. These 
a r e  explicit in  McDougall's conception of cognition and conation, just i s  
passage and extension a r e  there in his statement of disturbances proceeding 
from receptors to effectors through the nervous system. 
ception of the life of the organism as the maturation and conditiong of instincts, 
as the fulfillment of possibilities genetically determined, bespeaks his equable 
estimate of ontogenetic factors, neither entelechy nor the effect of the environ- 
ment being over o r  underrated. 
Moreover, h:s con- 
Two difficulties with his social psychology have become apparent. 
Instinct, which he supposed to  be defined by the restriction of receptors, 
the path of the disturbance, the characteristic cognition and conation arid 
the restricted effectors, have been shown to merge imperceptibly into >ne 
another so that, while the whole may be instinct, it is hardly proper to 
speak of an instinct. This criticism is obviously less significant here, 
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where it applies to Lacription, than in reflexology, where it applies to 
the principle itself. 
The fundamental difficulty with his psychology is to be sought else- 
where. He fails to account for  thinking. A man defined as a complex 
of maturing and modified instincts is capable of minding the world and 
having it matter to him; he is capable of learning, but he is not capable 
of reasoning. This is s o  because his cognitions and conations a r e  related 
by passage and extension to  other things, o r  to other cognitions and cona- 
tions; but not by idea and intention. 
and Parallelists, these have been defined into insignificant illusory by- 
products of the purely material process. 
he cannot substitute one thing for another the idea of which is the same, 
and because he does not enjoy the privilege of intending to do s a  The world 
may do it to him; that is, the world may condition his behavior, and that 
his behavior is altered is al l  that any other man may know about him a s  
passage and extension; in other words, in so far as he is matter, and 
someone else minds him. He can mind the world and have it matter to  
him; only he cannot think. 
A s  in the theories of the Occasionalists 
His man cannot reason because 
For  him there a r e  no propositions. 
Dynamic psychology arose as an off-shoot of social DYNAMISM. 
psychology. Its central concept w a s  that of a drive, o r  trend, an organic 
activity which due to repetition had come to resemble the instinct as des- 
cribed by McDougall. This off-shoot is of importance to  us  only because 
of its relation to the popular explanation of actions in terms of motives. 
Drives, conations and motives were confounded, thus preparing the way 
for psycho -analysis. 
The theme of desire as of vital importance to  the understanding of the 
universe -above all,  of man-through Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer 
and Nietzche, had dominated German philosophy. It had been carefully 
elaborated and clearly formulated to explain the actual relations of ideas 
in so  far a s  these were not inevitably determined by passage and extension 
from without. 
occurrence of one intended the occurrence of the other. 
fused with affect, feeling or emoQion, with drive, conation o r  motive. 
is not an idea, but the occurrence of an intention made specific only in so 
far a s  the related ideas a re  specified. But, because it is concerned with 
The Wunsch was  a relation of ideas by virtue of which the 
It is not to  be con- 
It 
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the occurrence of those ideas, the passage determining ser ia l  order has 
also to be considered. 
occurrence .. 
In this it differs from an intention, that it implies 
In psycho-analytical publications the term Wunsch has lost its technical 
distinction. 
in these writings because the context in which the symbol appears is not 
systematic, and hence its metaphysical foundation is absent. The t e rm 
Wunsch appears now for motive, now for drive, now for conation, now 
for intention, now for desire, wish or  will, 
sane man's action in terms of some motive. 
that we a r e  not always aware of our motives, though we may at some 
other time know what they were. But there a r e  some of our acts, such 
a s  walking into a door in  the dark o r  burning our mouths with soup, for 
which we can imagine no motive. 
of these is in terms of the Wunsch. 
consciousness"; in the second, it was won the threshold9 in the third, it 
was in the "subconscious." Human nature is stratified into the Superego, 
the Ego and the Id which a r e  approximate demonological equivalents for 
conscience, the I itself and the lust  of the flesh. 
elements derived from religion there exists a law for the ego, a censor- 
ship, which operates as a jailor to keep undesirables in the subconscious. 
But the recalcitrant Wunsch, illogically retaining identity in the subcon- 
scious where it assumes new defining ideas a s  a disguise, escapes cen- 
sorship, reappearing in consciousness a s  if it were acceptable to the Ego 
of which it would form a part. 
and unruly Wiinsche from the chaos of the Id masquerade in dream. 
a r e  those Wiinsche which if  they appeared naked would arouse censorship. 
But the Ego, by compelling them to wear  the proper guise, can satisfy rhem 
symbolically sublimating them to the Superego. Freud, Jung, Adler, Ferenzi 
and their patients disagree a s  t o  which Wiinsche a re  significant, objectionable 
or  acceptable; o r  what, their favorite disguises. 
whether these discrepancies are  of fact o r  form, for a l l  make use of middle 
terms sometimes undistributed, sometimes changing meaning from the 
major to the minor premise-in this respect resembling the Wunsch which 
changes its definition without losing its identity. In this psychology iio iew 
It is impossible to  be certain what is intended by any symbol 
It is popular to explain a 
But we know of ourselves 
The psycho-analytic explanation of all 
In the first case the Wunsch was 
In addition to these 
When we sleep the censorship is relaxed 
These 
It is impossible to tell 
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concepts appear, but familiar scientific notions a r e  confused and sub- 
ordinated to punitive and demonological recrudescences. 
ACT PSYCHOLOGY. With the possible exception of McDougall no 
psychologist from Hobbes to  Brentano has shown proper respect for the 
eidetic and intentional relation of thoughts to thoughts, o r  of thoughts to 
things. 
tigated the material relations of passage and extension. 
Jesuitically trained in ontology and versed in Scholastic Philosophy, 
approached the psychological phenomena from the mental aspect. His 
logical training seems to  have made it clear to  him that the idea itself 
was  just an identity predicable equally of thought o r  thing, image o r  
original. 
which he stated to  be characteristic of certain psychic acts. 
concerned with the passage and extension of these acts, but devoted his 
attention to mind rather than to minding. 
with intention rather than with idea, he achieved the statement of that 
relation that is fundamental to logic and mathematics, which Association- 
alistic psychology had not only failed to  formulate but failed to  recognize. 
His followers generalized his thesis concerning psychic acts and made 
intention the defining characteristic of all psychic acts , thereby excluding 
many activities ordinarily considered psychic. 
These relations were forgotten while scientific psychology inves-: 
But Brentano, 
He, therefore, turned his attention to the problem of intention 
He was not 
Yet, because he was concerned 
The attention to mind, instead of minding, and the restriction to physic 
acts characterized by intention, precluded any great experimental ful- 
fillment and rendered the phenomenology of his disciple, Husserl, an elab- 
orate system of theoretical relations among ideas and things, wherein the 
eidetic relations themselves seem subordinate to the system of intentions, 
as they a r e  in mathematics,instead of coordinate, as they are in aesthetics. 
Examination of the text discloses few factual propositions and a tendency to  
bracket the idea itself. 
whose theoretical justification requires their statement in terms of operations 
before they can be put t o  the factual test  of experience. 
and phenomenology, on account of their failure to consider the passage 
and extension and the idea of the phenomenon, have lost contact with the 
matter and quality of this world. 
ifying the notion of intention and have shown that no psychology can nope to  
Such imaginative generalizations produce hypotheses 
Act  psychology 
But they have served psychology by clar- 
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explain propositionalizing , thinking, reasoning o r  any other complex 
psychological doing, without the relation of intention. 
OBITER DICTUM. Thought is always related to thought mentally, 
i. e., by idea and intention; molecules a r e  always related to molecules 
materially, i. e., by passage and extension; but these relations are only 
discoverable o r  thinkable in the relation of mind and matter, i. e., in the 
concrete experience. All psychologies have failed that have attempted 
to ignore the mental o r  the material relations of thought to  thought o r  
thought to thing. In this chapter we have exhibited each psychological 
analysis in principle a s  exhibiting, with respect to human experience, a 
deficiency determined by the inadequacy of its metaphysical foundation. 
The Associationalistic , Gestalt and Behavioristic schools fail to exhibit 
mental relations ; Act psychology, material relations. 
exhibits mental and material relations of thoughts to things ; but not , of 
thoughts to  thoughts. 
experience without the introduction of hypotheses made nebulous by the 
exclusion of methodologically necessary terms simply because these 
t e rms  were not so preformed f o r  any psychology in the symbolic expression 
of its conceptions that they could be recognized as such. 
difficulty in psychology arises because the organism, itself experienced, 
itself experiences not only things beyond it but its own thought. 
adequate explanation of experience not only the material relation of 
thoughts to  things and the mental relation of thoughts to things, but also 
the mental and material relations of thoughts themselves a r e  all immed- 
iately requisite; whereas in physics it has been possible, t o  proceed intro- 
ducing the required relations explicitly seriatim. 
Social psycholozy 
None has achieved an adequate explanation of 
Actually, the 
For  
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CHAPTER I1 
THE SCIENCE OF MATThR 
ARGUMENT. Before there were men, organisms lived or died 
because they moved more o r  less; and, when man evolved, he inherited 
a host of those adaptive movements which had served his ancestors. 
Implicit in them was the recognition of passage and extension as inevi7 
table relations of things; but these remained implicit and it was not with 
these, a s  principles , that physical science arose. 
have been translated as  "efficient cause" , "material cause": "formal 
cause" and "final clause". 
and intention chiefly in this, that they a re  always considered by him as. 
particular. 
duces the given thing, its making, The "material cause" is the partic- 
ular "material" of which it is made. We now think of the activity as 
continuous when we speak of passage and of a temporo-spatial distri- 
bution of that activity when we speak of extension. 
"efficient cause" of that sword was the forging of that sword, and its 
"material cause", the bronze of which it was made. We know that, for 
that "material" to be bronze to  us ,  there must be some activity then and 
there,  in the world; and that activity implies passage. 
be seen as obviously related to the Aristotelian "material causem in a s  
much a s  "mattern is defined as that which occupies space through time. 
Taken together passage and extension cover the same relations a s  "effi- 
cient" and "materialn causes but in a more general and more precise 
manner. 
and "final causesn and idea and intention. But we a re  now concerned 
with physics, the proper field of which is "matter", the inevitable mate- 
rial relations of things called passage and extension. 
ment of the distinction between the God of Aristotle and the God of the 
Catholic Church. 
to passage and extension as the latter, o r  Spirit, is, to idea and intention. 
Aristotle had laid down four entities a s  the relations of things. They 
They differ from passage, extension, idea 
The "efficient causen is the particular activity which pro- 
To Aristotle the 
Extension can 
It is obvious that a comparable relation exists between "formal" 
To the genius of Thomas Aquinas we are  indebted for a clear state- 
The former, o r  Prime Mover, is a s  closely related 
To prove the importance of the Divine (idea and intention), Thomas 
Aquinas laid the cornerstone of science by starting men to study the 
Natural (passage and extension), knowing well that sooner or  later such 
a procedure would prove inadequate to explain experience. The succeEs 
of his scheme was dependent upon the clarity of his distinction and the 
partial success of the natural sciences. Both required time. 
The herezy of Bruno consisted chiefly in the fusion of the Natural 
and the Divine into a single world whose transcendent God was in no wa.y 
separable from it, for Bruno had a mind for the concrete which pre- 
cluded the acceptance of the ingenious separation of Thomas Aquinas. 
This marks both his greatness and his failure as a scientist. He pre- 
vented a rigid adherence to his forerunner's scheme. Concrete things 
were studied in a concrete world and it is not until the time of Newton 
that we find modern science emerging with the conception of the universe 
a s  inevitably determined by matter and motion. 
came to mean passage and extension. 
expecting an eidetic o r  intentional answer from a scientist; but "how", 
expecting passage and extension. 
synthesis of matter and motion in energy. 
Thomas Aquinas had achieved at least half of what he desired. 
the unsatisfactory perfection of that science the poets rebelled and the 
philosophers stood aloof. 
Natural science then 
Men no longer asked 'why", 
Science progressed rapidly to the final 
The distinction drawn by 
From 
NEWTONLAN MECHANICS, Mathematicians busied themselves with 
physical problems. 
of them matter and motion were known only a s  mathematical entities 
represented for  them symbolically. 
netism, beginning in the experiments of Faraday and ending in the equa- 
tions of Maxwell, is characteristic of this period in science. It gave a 
new approach to the problem of organizing scientific data. The equaticns 
of Maxwell displayed natural causation, so far as  its metrical properties 
were concerned a s  a mathematical association in sequence. 
were not content with such relations and demanded the material ether a s  
that in which waves passed, Experiment failed t~ discover the ether, but 
the mathematical propositions predicted what was actually found if  con- 
sideration of the ether was entirely omitted. 
They took idea and intention for granted. To many 
The work on electricity and mag- 
Scientists 
The equations related 
energy in Newtonian space and time. 
variables. The Newtonian conception of space and time did not prevent 
their natural, i. e. , causal synthesis. The space was Euclidean and 
time flowed equally in measured lapses. 
vacuum was found to be constant. 
space and time which we wil l  consider when we come to "relativity". 
What is of importance here is to note that physics had progressed to this 
point in the study of the material relations of things without the explicit 
introduction of ment a1 relation. 
These appeared a s  independent 
The velocity of light in a 
This yielded the missing relations of 
STATISTICAL MECHANICS. The logician, Boole, attempting an 
important refinement of Aristotelian logic, quantified the predicate. 
Because in logic all things a re  either A o r  not A, and B or  not B, it 
is possible to predicate independently of any one thing that it is either 
A o r  not A, and B or  not B. 
A, B; A, not B; not A,  B; not A, not B. It was now possible to count 
the numbers of things in any one of the four groups, and to study the 
numerical association of the predicables, A and B. 
of statistics from logic. 
This divided all things into four groups: 
This is the birth 
The name came from the study of states with respect to wealth, man 
power, etc., where facts, not necessarily causally related, were corre- 
lated. The statistical procedure found its first great application in biol- 
ogy. Here it yielded the statistical conception of "causation"; the 
"cause" being the universal, antecedent, covariant predicable. But such 
statistical "causal" relations were normally absent in that the correlation 
was not universal. 
o r  B, not A; as  well as those which were A, B; o r  not A, not B. 
There w e r e  always some things that were A, not B; 
The theory of probability, as developed in relation to  games of chance, 
w a s  used to "explain" the discrepant findings. 
tistics and the theory of probability produced statistical mechanics. 
fundamental notion in the theory of probability is that, given a limited 
group of possibilities and actual occurences, some of the possibilities 
must be realized. This occurrence, presupposed in the theory of proba- 
bility, is that which yields the proof required by the theory of probability; 
whereas, in the concept of statistical mechanics, the phenomena a re  sup- 
wsed to be of such dimensions that the particular Occurrences cannr>t be 
The combination of sta- 
The 
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discovered a s  such. 
robbed of proof, becomes the admission of ignorance - never to  be mis- 
taken for knowledge. 
Properly speaking the theory of probability, so 
This mathematical theory was composed primarily of the predicables 
of Boole (pure ideas), their mathematical relations (pure intentions); but 
these, being divorced from physical significance, this theory of ignorance 
required the hypothesis of randomness a s  the quality of its material 
correlate. 
and extension, ending in a universe of discrete entities related by equations 
instead of by passage and extension. Yet the physical world, matter, 
w a s  supposed to be driven and determined by passage and extension from 
which the predicables of Boole (ideas) and the mathematical relations 
(intentions) were forever excluded. 
What seemed at first a n  introduction of the Divine into the Natural 
The result was an hiatus of a physical kind, a want of passage 
proved in the end the widest breach. The Divine and Natural worlds, 
the mental and material worlds, were so far separated as to demand a 
new sysnthesis. Seen from the point of view of thermo-dynamics, o r  
statistical mechanics, some sort of God was requisite. Mental relations 
being specifically excluded from the universe, but the predicables of 
Boole (ideas) and the mathematical relations (intentions) being mistaken 
for that universe, God had to serve as passage and extension. 
alternative, namely that idea and intention were not mistaken for the 
physical world but that physical world strictly limited to  passage and 
extension, the God requisite was the God of Thomas Aquinas, the idea 
and intention always there, in experience. 
Apart  from these consequences of the fallacy of misplaced concrete- 
ness,  the theory of probability, as a quantitative statement of ignorance, 
has proved a profitable rationalization of intention. Its systematic appli- 
cation in the algebraic matrices, which have taken the place of mechanical 
models for atoms, has shown that a new constant, derived from experi- 
ence, must be introduced every time that a new potential fact is to be 
derived from the theory. This algebra is noncornmutative; that is, the 
order of operation is significant, though the duration required is negli- 
gible, but there is nothing to determine which order is correct. 
results differ by an entity of small, but finite, magnitude. 
The other 
a 
The 
For such a 
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system of reasoning, this represents the limit of observable differences. 
In te rms  of this theory lesser magnitudes would be meaningless, unthink- 
able, indeterminate, nonexistent. This is that %ltimate" of which we  
must forever be ignorant, if we are to presuppose randomness in place 
of passage and extension, because we mistook the predicables of Boole 
for things; o r  equations, for material relations. Passage is related to 
the one-wayedness of the world and so to the serial order of operations; 
but this order of the world has failed to determine the serial order of the 
mathematical operations intended to represent it, That Maxwell had an 
uncanny foresight of such sequelae to statistical mechanics is proved by 
his caution concerning randomness; and, again, by his invention of the 
daemon who could exercise an intentional selection of particular variants 
of random motion. 
reconcile particular formulatiolir of the second law of Thermodynamics 
with biological processes; many of which suggest that, with respect to 
living matter, many occurrences fail t o  exhibit that randomness T-:hizh 
we, in our ignorance, have attributed to  them. 
This daemon has served several quaint attempts to 
BIOLOGY; Until recently biologists have been deceived less fre- 
quently than physicists by the apparent sundering of the "Natural" from 
the "Divine". There have been two reasons for this. 
Historically, biology, springing full-fledged from the brain of 
Aristotle with an enormous factual equipment, had, as its organizing 
principle, the entelechy, or  end-in-operation. Of two seeds, equally 
cared for, one became wheat and the other grass,  if one was originally 
wheat and the other grass. A comparable finding exiskd for eggs. The 
young of any species became the adult of that species, not of some other. 
In the living of the seed, of the egg, of the young of any species was 
implicit the mature form as "final cause".: The answer to the question, 
fo r  what kind of bird is this the egg, was, naturally, the particular kind 
of bird that it would normally become - not some other. 
that egg meant the becoming of that bird. 
potentiality was not achieved in physics until physicists, in order to have 
a law of the Conservation of Energy, postulated potential energy. Seen 
from this aspect, entelechy is the law of Conservation of Species. The 
energy which men experienced, like the bird that the egg would be, was 
The living of 
Such a clear conception of 
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not the "efficient cause", but the "final cause", of the physical thing 
which possessed potential energy. The energy which the falling of a 
stone exhibits does not hold it in place before it falls any more than the 
bird that the egg wi l l  be keeps the parts of the egg in order. The "effi- 
cient cause", or passage, exhibits the one-wayedness of the world. 
direction of intention is not so inevitably determined. 
only actual in the here and now, the past and future of which a re  given 
for and in it through intention. 
diction of experience, past and to come. 
supposes a reversal  of passage when he argues from what is to what was, 
o r  expects what he does not know. 
intention, real  in the present moment, no matter what he intends. 
Intending exhibits the one-wayedness of the world: Intention does not. 
Entelechy, or the end-in-operation, like potential energy, completes an 
intentional systematization. 
the outstanding varieties of organisms to a system of genus and species. 
His classification has stood the test of time and preserved, almost to  
our day, entelechy intact. Implicit in it is the conception of living a s  a 
process transcending any particular fact of previous structure. 
notion of function in the widest biological sense of which growth, irrita- 
bility, conductivity, and reproductivity constitute a partial analysis, 
being derivatives of the same process with respect to particular variables 
which are,  themselves, not separable. 
The 
Experience is 
Science exists in the record and pre- 
Neither physicist nor biologist 
His  intending exhibits the passage of 
It made it possible for Aristotle to  reduce 
It is the 
The second reason for the biological bridge over the widening chasm 
between the mental and the material is always new. 
a re  living organisms and, except for polemical purposes, never deny 
that they have purposes; and even then, when they deny that they intend, 
they know that they intend to deny. 
the scientist in question frequently reminds him that, dealing with living 
organisms, he may be confronted with ones sufficiently like him to intend. 
A s  a scientist, he must be wary of attributing his own intentions to that 
which he is observing. 
observed intends. 
which to decide whether a given observed intends or not. 
been accom-plished, though much behavior is predictable in terms of 
Men, themselves, 
This eternally present intention of 
But this is no valid reason for denying that the 
What is requisite is the formulation of a criterion by 
This has never 
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1 
intentions of the man - but not of the stone. 
implies intentions, but few psychiatrists would be so bold a s  to  suggest 
that that which behaved symbolically was necessarily aware of so intending. 
Relieved of its spurious halo of consciouness, intentionality appears 
closely related to adaptability on the one hand, entelechy on the other. 
For this reason we should expect to find intention characteristic of living 
organisms, more significantly in the more fully evolved. 
intending that those organisms who were good physicists, in the Comtian 
sense, won for us the ability to produce and distribute, of what we wanted, 
more than we could consume. 
scale has ever achieved so much by intention. 
their achievements by accepting their philosophy. 
In general, symbolic activity 
It was just by 
No animal below man in the evolutionary 
No biologist can neglect 
BIOPHYSICS. Physicists and Chemists have invaded the biological 
field without becoming biologists. They have attempted the study of 
structure and function in terms of passage and extension alone. 
have obtained and organized innumerable facts of matter and motion of 
organisms and of parts of organisms. But most of them have failed to 
realize that they were dealing with only one aspect of a functioning 
entirety exhibiting entelechy and intention. Theirs is the fallacy of mis- 
placed concreteness; that of supposing the material (passage and exten- 
sion) to be a complete analysis of experience, as well a s  of the thing d 
there for them in experience, even when the thing is a man, like them- 
selves, capable of experiencing; while the physicists, in physics proper, 
have reached the comprehensive exposition of their simpler problem. 
Having stumbled upon the constancy of the velocity 
of light in a vacuum while they were looking for the material ether, 
physicists were able to establish a quantity of space physically equiva- 
lent to a quantity of time, but the quantity of time imaginary; that is to 
say, directed perpendicularly to all dimensions of space. 
They 
RELATIVITY. 
Minkow ski had evolved a four-dimensional continuum containing 
so-called world-lines, the mtersections of which represented discover- 
able events. 
continuum. 
Lor ent z 
quantitative 
He treated time as an imaginary in the metric of the - 
had produced the formula for the rotation of axes, a s  a 
statement of the requisite shortening of a body in the 
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direction of motion through the ether, to account for the constancy of the 
velocity of light. 
In the theory of relativity, Einstein subsumes these diverse contri- 
butions by the use of definitions, in terms of operations, which showed 
that the distinction between space and time w a s  not absolute but dependent 
upon the method of abstraction from experience. 
conclusion that even serial  order of facts in experience is determined 
by the relative rnotions of experienced and experiencer. Experiment 
has verified his predictions so that the general theory of relativity, with 
its metaphysical implications, has  become the categorical necessity 
with which all physical laws must comply. 
w e  must consider the mental and material relations not only from observer 
to observed, but from observer to observer; for, given these relations, 
it is possible to predict the observations of the one from the observations 
of the other. It is this explicit analysis of concrete experience, in which 
facts a r e  related inter- and intra-personally, which is responsible for 
that community of agreement which Einstein has called truth. 
This led him to the 
This theory, with the critique of Whitehead, showed that, for science, 
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CHAPTER IJ3 
THE SCIENCE OF THE CONCRETE 
ARGUMENT 
EXPERIENCE. It is possible to describe, but it is not possible to  
To each man there is an "if" that is happening of 
Experience for any man is just what it is 
define, experience. 
which he is somehow aware. 
that is happening to  him a s  he knows it. It is, for him, the universe that 
is concrete. Intended beyond it, a re  only extrapolations - however 
assured he may be of them; subsumed beneath it, a r e  all presupposi- 
tions of reality; and above it, only that nothing on which it all depends. 
But any spatial analogy is misleading. What is important here is that 
experience is the totality which w e  would analyze because it is that total- 
ity of which any science is a partial. 
that there a re  innumerable modes of analysis, each yielding entities 
which are ,  for it, elemental. No such set of entities is either right or 
wrong. Er rors  a r i se  when 
the elements produced by the analysis of one modality a r e  confused with 
those of another. 
ALTERNATIVE MODES OF ANALYSIS. This is sufficient to  show 
It is just the set produced by that analysis. 
The Aristotelian analysis was one which preserved the thinghood of 
its elements. These elements (called things) were concrete in all but 
that sense in which only facts are concrete in experience. Because of 
this lack of ultimate concreteness, for synthesizing facts again from 
things, other entities were requisite. 
(translated "causes"). 
were the relata. 
These were called by him aitia 
Aitia ("causes") were the relations when things 
RELATA AND RELATIONS. It is characteristic of aqy mode of 
analysis that it must produce at least two types of entities; one, the 
obvious analytical elements, and the other, those by-no-means obvious 
entities which ar ise  because the analysis was made in that particular 
manner in which it was made. These are,  if you will, those entities 
which the resynthesis requires t o  produce the original. The -. 
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obvious elements a re  called the relata and the by-no-mews obviolis 
entities a r e  called the relations of those relata. 
sequent synthesis is that which requires the relations that the past par- 
ticiple appears in the words relata and relations and it is because there 
was an original which has to  be synthesized again that the prefix "re" 
appears in the words relata and relation. 
It is because the sub- 
AITIA AS THE RELATIONS O F  THINGS. The relata in the A r i s -  
totelian scheme a re  things (represented in primitive speech by nouns, 
such a s  the fire, the dog, the altar and the sword) which a r e  now, as 
they were in the beginning, the obvious entities in experience. Aitia 
("causes") were all those complex relations which things might bear to  
one another. Aristotle divided them into four major groups, translated 
efficient," " formal" and " f i n a l  cause"; the Romans into 
two, l'causatt and "forma," subsuming, respectively, " efficient" and 
"final causes," and "material' and "formal causes"; the English (and 
German) into two, nere called matter (Materie) and mind (Seele) sub- 
suming, respectively, efficient" and "material causes," and "formal" 
and "final causes." Physics, with the critique of Whitehead, has clar- 
ified " efficient'* and "material causes' a s  passage and extension; psy- 
chology has pointed the way to  a similar critique of "formal' and "final 
cause," yielding idea and intention as  we have used those terms. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated systematically these 
developments in science clarifying the mental and material relations of 
things and they have indicated the possibility and utility of the concepts 
of Minding and Mattering which we shall attempt to formulate in this 
chapter . 
AITIA AS ABSTRACT RELATA. For the generic notions we must 
return to the general problem of relata and relations, made specific in 
the attempt to an-ilyze any concrete thing into its abstract relations. The 
possibility of such an analysis resides in the ultimate concreteness of 
facts the analysis of which by the inverse mode yields the aitia (causes) 
as  the elements and their relation as  thinghood. 
a r e  familiar to the mathematician and a re  always feasible i f  there exists 
an entity submitting to the alternative modes of analysis, 
procedure, predicated upon the togetherness of two modes of analysis, 
Such transformations 
It is just this 
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which constitutes the intuition of the mathematician. 
CONCRETENESS O F  THINGS. Apart, then, from its thinghood, a 
given thing is analyzable into passage and extension, and idea and inten- 
tion. These conjugate abstracta, mind and matter, analyze the thing of 
experience; and thinghood appears as the concreteness of the thing s o  
analyzed. To attribute t o  either mind or matter the concreteness of the 
thing of experience is fallacious. 
INDUCTION. There is an error which is prone to creep into logical 
discussions from the t e r r a  incognita of ontology. 
it, there is suggested in the Principia Mathematica that that which is 
common to all cannot be one of them. 
induction. 
what is the relation of the relations to the relata. 
require that that which w a s  by definition relation become relatum, Whether 
or not this may occur ultimately depends on the givenness of the original 
relata and their relations. If this is such that there exists an entity sub- 
mitting to  the alternative modes of analysis (so that those which appeared 
a s  relata appear a s  relations, and vice versa),  then there exist relatively 
concrete entities whose concreteness will  appear a s  a derivative condi- 
tional thinghood when what was originally relation is regarded a s  a rela- 
tum and vice versa. Such transformations a re  not logically permissible 
in deductive processes which necessarily proceed by predication, which 
is in general away from the concrete; whereas, in induction, not only 
a re  such transformations requisite, but justified by the thinghood implicit 
in the givenness when, and only when, this givenness is such that there 
is some entity submitting t o  the alternative mode of analysis. That is 
why the inductive process (the flight of imagination of Claude Bernard) 
yields f o r  the scientist not a thesis, but a hypothesis, which, approached 
from the deductive standpoint, resembles the fallacies of illicit process 
of either premise o r  the undistributed middle term, but which actually 
ar ises  because that which was common to all has become one of them, 
though not in the original sense. The change of sense brings us  to  the 
problem of the metabasis eis all0 genos. 
In order to preclude 
This law separates deduction from 
Given relata and their relations, it is inappropriate to ask, 
To answer this would 
METABASIS EIS ALL0 GENOS. When Aristotle schematized the 
world of known things in terms of the logic of genus and species, he w a s  
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confronted by a strange phenomenon. 
the relation was simply from all to some. 
a s  differentia which were essentially the relation of genus and species 
a s  relata. 
some sort of equal footing in the definition of the genus, entities of one 
kind had to become entities of another kind. 
eis all0 genos. 
In passing from senus to  species 
But there arose such entities 
But when he had to consider species and differentia as on 
This is called the metabasis 
In essence the metabasis eis all0 genos is always some transforma- 
tion from relata to  relation o r  vice versa.  Because only a single entity 
was considered, the reciprocal transformation was wanting; and it was 
not immediately apparent that the metabasis eis all0 genos was depend- 
ent upon the analysis in alternative modes of some more concrete entity, 
with respect to which relata and relations were abstract. 
Let us  compare this obscure statement, when a single entity is con- 
sidered, with the obvious proposition, when both transformations a re  
present. 
calculation: 
G o  Ones = one Two. 
a s  adjective, Ones a s  noun; on the right side of the equation, one a s  
adjective, Two as  noun. 
analyze it a s  two Ones (first mode) or  one Two (second mode). 
nouns be understood a s  relata and the adjectives as  relations, in the 
metabasis one exhibits the transition from relatum to relation, whereas 
Two exhibits the transition from relation to relatum. This is simply 
because the left side of the equation represents one mode of analysis, 
the right side the alternative mode. 
essentially statements predicated upon the givenness of some entity sub- 
mitting to the alternative modes of analysis. 
Suppose a man is given two stones and performs the following 
One and one equal two. Let us make explicit the four terms; 
Here we have, on the left side of the equation, two 
- 
So long a s  he has both stones "given," he may 
If the 
A l l  mathematical identities a r e  
LOCALIZATION. For the primitive man simple calculations were 
possible because calculi were things exhibiting mental and material rela- 
tions. 
marks for fingers and neural correlates for the marks. 
always have been something in his brain corresponding to the pebbles, 
mentally as well as materially. 
but it is inconceivable that he could do without something in his brain; 
He improved on the process when he substituted fingers for stones, 
There must 
He has learnt t o  do without the pebbles, 
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thpt is to say, he has substituted completely a thing in his head for a thing 
which originally required parts (pebbles or fingers or marks) outside of 
his head. 
and from brain to pebbles. 
within his head. 
BRIEF. 
Now there need be no passage of energy from pebbles to brain 
He thinks; and the process is completely 
The problem is to  trace the development of inductive rea- 
soning (by means of this metabasis) from its Anlage in lower evolutionary 
forms to its present manifestation in social man. 
EVOLUTION 
BEGINNINGS. It is no far cry from a professor to  a lung-fish. As 
such, both a re  in a condition of intermediateness between what was and 
what is to be, not merely in  the sense that both exhibit passage and exten- 
sion, but in this, that the essential quality of both is that, in them, there 
is discernible that ambiguity derived from thinghood; namely, there is 
clearly implicit that which is given as  intention in the relation of the things 
of experience. 
fish is to be found in the professor's use of symbols, permitting reference 
of his intentions to himself. The professor can conceive that the lung-fish 
intends, as well as  that he himself intends; in the lung-fish the apparatus 
for symbolic analysis and synthesis has not sufficiently evolved. 
The major difference between the professor and the lung- 
The advantage enjoyed by the professor has arisen largely through 
language in so far a s  he is a professor. 
ever it is written o r  spoken or thought. At  its best,, it exhibitsa universality 
and eternity of idea, in  no wise dependent upon its particular appearance 
in time and space. 
words (that is to say, the riveting of attention to the mental aspects of tne 
things called words) which has made possible logic. In this sense, words, 
whenever they appear, a re  the occasions (or events) for  Platonic ideas 
(orwhiteheadean objects) in the universe of discourse. 
attempt to neglect, for logical purposes, the passage and extension involved 
in  these things. 
these intentions the wrulesw are those of logic, A s  such, they a re  change- 
less relations of changeless entities. 
The word is itself a thing when- 
It is just this once-for-allness, intended in all such 
We habitually 
They a re  related for u s  significantly by intention and of 
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In terms of words alone ontogeny could never be expressed or ontology 
defined. 
and extension- but the relations of passage and extension among things 
(among which must be numbered words). Presumably for  this reason 
Buddha found it necessary to  hold his disciple under water and Samuel 
Johnson, to strike his foot against a stone. 
to as causal efficacy, to convey which even the professor is apt to resort  
to physical violence. It is matter, not mind. Here the professor and the 
lung-fish a re  equal, and it is here that we must look for the effective ele- 
ments in ontology. 
But the parallelism between the lung-fish and the professor extends 
still further. Each is,  as it were, an exemplification of the process of 
"Phylogenesis," seeming anomalous among its well-adjusted neighbours 
- welladjusted, but confined to  evolutionary insignificance by the per- 
fection of that adjustment t o  a smaller portion of the universe; for the 
lung-fish exemplified the transition from water-to air-breathing animals 
and the professor, that from common sense to philosophy. 
These demand passage and extension- nDt the ideas of passage 
This is what Whitehead refers 
ONTOGENY. It is one among many characteristics of experience that 
what it was, is and, will  be a r e  not the same. This Whitehead has called, 
"the creative advance of nature." The event that was there and then has 
passed into the event that is here and now. In the antecedent event cer- 
tain Platonic ideas found their occasion. The events (passage and exten- 
sion), together with the Whiteheadean objects (ideas) there in them for 
the experiencer, constitute the things intended by the thoughts of the 
experiencer, These things a r e  not necessarily the same,things as those 
of the second experience, though they are  inevitably related to them by 
passage and extension. We have seen how Aristotle made use of intention 
to relate the eggs to the aftercoming chick and the chick to  the full-grown 
bird. 
respect to idea (Whiteheadean object) but related by intention a s  well a s  
by passage and extension. 
potentiality of that bird which it actually becomes. 
manifest early a s  an egg and late a s  a bird; that even which was quali- 
tatively an egg has passed into that even which is qualitatively a bird. If 
it had not Seen fertilized it would hsve remained forever an egg. 
This exhibits two entities, the egg and the bird, different with 
That is to say, implicit in that egg is the 
There is one thing 
But, in 
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2s much 2s it v2.s fertilized, there appeared a condition of intermedizte- 
ness between an egg and a bird; in other words, the passage from the 
event, egg, to the event, bird, required time; or, in still other words, 
there was a time during which it was equally appropriate, or inappropri- 
ate, to speak of it as  an egg, or a bird; and this is true not only of the 
egg and of the bird, but of the Anlage of any entity and of its ultimate 
entity in that bird. Now, an unfertilized egg is capable of living, albeit 
in a quiescent form, for a very long time in a very specialized environ- 
ment; whereas, the fertilized egg becomes what it was not, and is cap- 
able of living in a new environment. We do not think of the unfertilized 
egg as playing any par t  in evolution. 
ESSENTIAL NOVELTY. The development of the bird from the egg 
is commonly referred to  under the head of ontogeny, whereas the evolu- 
tion of one species in another is commonly referred to as  phylogeny. The 
reason for  this  is apparent. The b i rds  lay eggs; the eggs become birds 
of the same kind. 
over a fairly long range of time, no new kind of entity appears. 
not so of that arising of one phylum in another. 
the total number of ideas (Platonic ideas, Whiteheadean objects), the 
second does; that is, there is an essential novelty in phylogenesis wanting 
in ontogenesis. 
The unfertilized egg is excluded from evolution because 
it never becomes anything but an egg. 
because it becomes the bird that it was not (ontogenesis). If it yielded a 
bird of a species different from any preexisting species (phylogenesis), it 
would become that which never had been before it instead of merely that 
which it never had been before. For  thing-minded man such distinctions 
have always been difficult. 
instead of seeming that which it is: 
entelechy which is fundamental to both, ontogeny and phylogeny, because 
entelechy is that in terms of which phylogeny itself is most easily under- 
stood. 
only that species in which was already implicit the possibility of the 
required species. 
that the way in  which new species ar ise  from old ones is a s  truly orderly 
The whole process is reproductive so that, considered 
This is 
The first does not increase 
PHYLOGENY. 
The fertilized egg is included 
For  him phylogeny seems a denial of ontogeny 
The transcendental aspect of that 
It is not any old species which gives rise to  a given new one but 
This may seem a complicated way of saying, simply, 
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3 s  the way in which eggs b t c h  into birds;  but it differs from such a 
statement in that it exhibits this orderliness as  an analytical element of 
the full concreteness of experience rather than as a discovery of a mys- 
terious law imposed upon things which one might have expected lawlessly 
together in experience. 
EMBRYOLOGY. One frequently hears given a s  the law of embryology 
This seems to follow as a that ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis. 
natural consequence of the ontogenic process which is essentially repeti- 
tive except in so far as  it is affected by environment. 
change brought about in some particular organism of a given species such 
that some tissue or organ, which had been elaborated through adaptation 
to its environment during the life of that particular organism, becomes 
hereditarily determined in the next generation, there has arisen a change 
of the phylogenetic type. 
yielding a new species in the Aristotelian sense, then it is apparent that 
ontogenesis wil l  exhibit this novel hereditary step of development a s  the 
last modification of those preexisting; that is to say, phylogenesis 
" capitulates" ontogenesis. 
When there is a 
If this alteration persists in ensuing generations, 
TREND. That changes of the type described produce organisms usually 
They have, ab initio, better adapted t o  their environment is self-apparent. 
what their ancestors had to  acquire. 
organisms to  become overspecialized for par t icdar  en-*ironments and 
that process, given still greater freedom to  overspecialization by its 
(achieved adequacy, to end in monstrosities such a s  avergrowths of weap- 
ms of offense or defense. 
yield organisms less  adaptable because they would have to achieve in their 
lives what their ancestors had ab initio. 
among men and a re  commonly called throw-backs. It is ,  of course, con- 
ceivable that some alteration might occur determining for the next gen- 
eration some entity of adaptive value not prefigured in its ancestors. 4 
few years ago many such seemed possible in our ignorance of phylogen- 
esis; but, wherever the evolutionary process is known in detail of fine 
gradations, they a re  absent. In their stead appears some madification 
given, ab initio, to the young which w a s  foreshadowed in the ancestral 
adult, but wiiicii finds new functions in the light of new experience. 
We should therefore expect some 
A change in the reverse direction would usunlly 
Such monstrosities exist even 
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. 
Organisms thus m-odified are in the ambiguous state. 
THE AMBIGUOUS STATE 
SIZE AND SHAPE. There are  certain advantages which accrue to an 
organism by increase of bulk, provided the activity of that bulk remains 
constant per unit volume; but the activity depends ultimately upon sur- 
faces and hence necessitates an increase in area proportionate to volume 
- i f  the shape were held constant the volume would increase as  the cube, 
and the surface as the square of any diameter of the organism. In order 
to secure an increase of area proportionate to  an increase in volume, 
changes of shape a re  requisite, being convolutions of that surface. Very 
small organisms may be spherical, larger ones may be cylindrical; an 
external surface and relatively tubular gut suffice f o r  the earthworm. 
Specialization of particular portions of these surfaces occur. 
ceivable varieties of irregularities seem to have been tried. Among 
these was a pouch, or diverticulum, on the ventral aspect of the gut at 
its cephalic end, adjacent ta  the gill slits. Originally it was just a part 
of the alimentary tract, here specialized for the ingestion of food. It had 
a rich blood supply associated with that of the bronchial arches. 
extreme vascularity facilitated the absorption of soluble substances 
directly into the blood stream. Its size increased. 
a storehouse for food had not its vascularity been so great or  had not the 
stomach already existed. 
Al l  con- 
Its 
It might have become 
SPECIALIZATION. Two alternative uses were found for it, both of 
which were predicated upon its preexisting vascularity. 
living in deep waters it became a bladder, ultimately divorced from its 
original connection with the gut. It served then as an organ to increase, 
or decrease, specific gravity thus enabling them to maintain their depth 
in the water or to sink by the absorption of gas from it through the blood 
vessels, or to rise by the secretion of gas from the blood vessels into it. 
(1) In some fish 
This evolution terminated in the swim bladder. 
in shallow, stagnant water where they could procure a i r  from the surface, 
but not adequately from the water, it served to  hold and absorb a bubble 
procured from above. This preserved them in seasons of drought when 
(2)  In others, who lived 
. 
they Sxried thezxselves in the Amud z-nd swzllowed air extensively, disT 
tending the diverticulum and stimulating its blood supply. The divertic- 
ulum increased with use, its surface becoming more convoluted a s  it 
increased in bulk. Evolution in this direction culminated in the lung. 
This diverticulum at all stages has exhibited THE AMBIGUITY. 
some function. 
vascularized, was the potentiality not only of its further development a s  
an alimentary organ, but also of its development a s  an organ for dealing 
with gases - and this of two varieties, swim bladder or  lung, neither of 
which w a s  implicit potentially in any other diverticulum of that gut, and 
there were many. That is, there was a stage in evolution when certain 
organisms with this increasing diverticulum might tend in either of two 
directions; one left them fish, albeit with a swim bladder; the other 
gave r i se  to amphibia, reptiles, birds and mammals. A t  the parting of 
the ways the organism was in the ambiguous state. 
might retain its alimentary function or further differentiate to  deal with 
gases alone; and even those organisms in which it had become an organ 
for gases were still in the ambiguous state because the diverticulum had 
still retained the potentiality for swim bladder or lung. 
advantage over others with respect to  adaptation. They may evolve in 
either of two ways, one of which may be essentially novel. Now, adap- 
tation requires: 
of response to environment, (2) that, among these modes, one occur such 
that by it the organism continues to live, (3)  that that mode of response 
become the preferred mode of response in ensuing reactions. 
in essence, the same requirement as  that determining evolution in all 
cases,  whether we consider the evolution of individuals o r  of species. 
Implicit in this organ situated where it was and highly 
Its diverticulum 
ADAPTATION. Organisms in the ambiguous state have a great 
(1) that the organism be capable of two or more modes 
This is ,  
MUTATIONS. A s  yet we  do not know in any case how mutations arise,  
though we occasionally produce them. 
said of the production of variants of response. 
iations of response, we do know that that which w e  may obtain is deter- 
mined in large measure by thatwith. which we have to start. 
Not long ago the same might be 
Of both mutations and var- 
SELECTION. The second requirement is by no means always fulfilled 
by occurrences of the first type. Dominant albinism, which appears as a 
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mutation xxong cer-tzin vzrieties of small fish, gener4ly ensured the 
death of the mutant; certain acquired variations of behavior, such a s  
leaping from high places, usual ly  end in death. 
alimentary diverticulum to lung, like the study of mathematics by the 
physicist, a r e  obvious examples of the successful type. 
The mutations from 
REPETITION. The third requirement seems far  more likely to be 
fulfilled than the second; but a study of triploiding, tetraploiding, etc., 
and of hardy hybrids, shows that, though the change may resemble a 
mutation, it is not necessarily transmissible and may even preclude the 
possibility of those offspring requisite for its continuous repetition. The 
same is true of many successful operations performed, but not repeatable, 
by the performer. 
PHYLOGENETIC IMPORTANCE OF THE AMBIGUOUS STATE. Yet 
these prerequisites of adaptation a re  insufficient in the case of evolution. 
For  this the ambiguous state is necessary. Only from organisms in the 
ambiguous state can we expect adaptations to a new kind of entiQ. Even 
here the novelty is not as great as it seems. The fish had always to  deal 
with gases; but before, those gases existed in solution, whereas after 
the ambiguous state they existed alone. 
in solution there is hardly any possibility that he could have distinguished 
them a s  different from the water that passed through his gill slits. There 
may have been qualitative differences for him between water rich in n i r  
and water poor in air, for these were affectively related to him. 
qualitative difference, or  the corresponding affect, was the only pre- 
cursor  of a i r  as air  for him. 
When the fish dealt with them 
This 
ORIGIN OF IDEA AND INTENTION 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. In no organ other 
than the nervous system does ontogeny recapitulate phylogeny with the 
same exquisite faithfulness of fine gradations. 
no other organ has been so significant in adaptation o r  presented so habit- 
ually the ambiguous state. It is enough for  our purpose here  to show how 
the shift was possible in neural function from direct response to  symbolic 
behavior . 
This is possibly so  because 
3? 
SYMROLIC IMPLICIT. That such 2 shift has occurred suggests that 
symbolism which occurs as  such in this text for writer and reader was 
implicit in the mode of behavior which appears a s  direct. 
we would expect to find in the behavior of more ancient types that certain 
activities were more symbolic than others. A s  a matter of fact we find 
symbolizing, like gaseous interchange, always present in organisms. Our 
lungs have evolved as the organs of respiration, and our brain a s  the organs 
of symbolizing. The significant difference is this, that the gills have been 
replaced by the lungs whereas the nervous system retained its role of sig- 
nificance. 
In other words: 
SYMBOLEIN. The nervous system is that part of the organism which 
is differentiated for the conduction of physico-chemical disturbances from 
one part of the organism to the other. It produces a disturbance in one 
end which originated at  the other. This is representation neurally of events 
presented extraneurally. At the site of representation it may encounter 
other disturbances (original or represented there). This is symbolein," 
the coming together by representation of entities originally separate. When 
the response of the organism is initiated by such a coming together within 
it of entities originally separate, it is legitimate t o  speak of that activity 
as "symbolic" - albeit in its most primitive form. 
DIFFERENTLATION AND INTEGRATION. When particular combina- 
This happens far down in the evolu- 
The nervous system begins in a relatively diffuse fash- 
tions of representative disturbances a re  requisite for different types of 
response, differentiation has begun. 
tional hierarchy. 
ion and retains, even in the highest forms, innumerable interconnections 
effecting integration, originally by totalizing the behavior (and this is never 
entirely lost) and later by yielding particular integrals by recombining 
specific differential components, themselves integral with respect to 
Ggher orders of derivatives. 
SPECIALIZATION O F  RECEPTORS. Evolution a t  the receptive end 
occurred, yielding sense organs. 
At one time they exhibited the ambiguous state. 
for pressure, others for light touch, others for changes in temperature, 
some for  change toward the higher and some, toward the lower end of the 
scale. Still others differentiated for chemical interaction with the 
These sense organs were not all alike. 
Some were specialized 
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environment, yielding slmell md taste. 
for electromagnetic waves yielding sight. 
differentiated for  physical contact (tough and pressure) a still further dif- 
ferentiation occurred, yielding an organ particularly responsive to  the 
vibrations of the air  and another susceptible to changes in pressure due 
to motion and position- the cochlear and vestibular apparatus. But w e  
do not need to follow these developments in particular. They exemplify 
no new principle. 
Still another group differentiated 
Among the groups origihally 
ORIGIN OF ETERNAL OBJECTS. What is important for us  now is 
that, when such an organism passed from a hot to a cold place, all of the 
receptors of decrement of temperature were thrown into adiv-iQ together 
making possible by the representation of the disturbance of the separate 
organs the response to falling temperature as  such. 
this specificity of the sense organs themselves demonstrates how many 
qualities of the universe a r e  determined by them, and the study of the 
corresponding neural a r  rangernent s shows how segregated the structures 
associated with each become. 
Whiteheadean object) t o  which corresponds a differential element of neu- 
ra l  structure. 
Careful study of 
Each such quality is an idea (Platonic idea, 
But these structures in higher organisms a re  represented again and 
again neurally at the so-called higher levels making possible new differ- 
entiations in each type of experience- 
"Platonic ideas." Sense organs are  scattered through the volume occupied 
by the organism. When a given complex of these a r e  stimulated by some 
ordinary thing, say a pencil, and then this same thing is rapidly trans- 
ferred to other parts of the body, stimulating successively complexes of 
end-organs, the neural disturbance representing the first stimulation by 
that thing has not completely disappeared when the next complex arrives.  
The result is that there is, in that organism, one prolonged disturbance 
in the central nervous system corresponding to !!th&'pencil." Now, the 
nervous system is an adaptive mechanism able to preserve a trance of its 
previous behavior such that aftercoming behavior tends to follow the orig- 
inal pattern, Thus it is possible for the organism to respond to the pencil 
as such on a subsequent occasion. Such coininon things a r e  characterized 
ORIGIN OF ENDURING OBJECTS. We return to  another origin of 
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for text o y g m i s r n  r ) ; ~  1 "Platonic idea" which 2 p i n  corresponds to struc- 
ture within the organism. This means that with respect t o  this "pattern" 
of stimulation there w i l l  correspond a "pattern" of response. 
shown, as  for example in the case of the ear,  how there can correspond a 
structure t o  a particular type of succession in time. 
relation in space, most easily followed from the kinaesthetic sources, 
but also obvious in the eye. 
It can be 
The same is s o  of 
So much for the neural correlates of Platonic ideas. They a r e  ana- 
lytical elements of experience; their neural correlates a re  differential 
elements of structure. 
INTENTION IMPLICIT IN THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS. But 
intention as  well as idea has it neural correlate discernible in the funda- 
mental neural activity, symbolein, from the stage in which it is implicit 
to that in which it appears in logical demonstration. 
the sense in which a disturbance at one end of the neuron is represented 
at the other, implies the identity of the disturbance throughout. 
cold, which the organism experienced no matter which of these receptors 
for decrement of temperature was stimulated, exhibits identity of ulti- 
mate disturbance to  a multiplicity of initial disturbances - in this case 
multiplicity "of which" sense organs, but not "of what kind.' With respect 
to this idea all those events were identical, however otherwise dissimi- 
lar. 
Representation in 
That 
ANTICIPATION, FREEDOM AND ERROR. Now let us return to  the 
experience with the pencil. 
neurally to it as usual. It has been lying on the window sill. 
writing. 
cold appears suddenly. The neural activity associated with the pencil had 
not been such as  to include the response to cold before. Warmth had been 
implicitly there. 
be warm. 
t o  run in its previous pattern. 
ent occasion, events followed their former course. 
vals required for the neural processes a re  less  than those of the extra- 
neural even (which frequently happens) the neural activity anticipates 
the extraneural activity. 
I pick up the pencil and a m  beginning to  react 
I start  
But the metal end comes against my hand and the reaction to 
I was startled and realized that I had expected it to  
This exemplifies expectation as  the tendency of neural activity 
The organism reacts as  if ,  or) the pres- 
When the t ime inter- 
This dependence of neural activity upon 
i=mediife extern21 events, carrying with it by implication that it may 
(or may not) correspond to  that external event, makes it possible for the 
organism to adapt in an unusually successful manner (or in an unusually 
unsuccessful manner) to  its immediate environment. These sudden suc- 
cesses and failures, entailing sudden changes in the quality and distribu- 
tion of immediate aftercoming neural disturbances which either reenforce 
the original i f  successful or disrupt it if unsuccessful, have themselves 
led to neural representation in  structure until we now have for them ideas. 
INTENTION EXPLICIT. When Aristotle saw a certain kind of egg, 
he expected a certain kind of bird. It was not that bird, but it might 
become that bird. The immediate stimulation yielded "the egg.n The 
anticipatory activity from that stimulation yielded the bird. They were 
wont to occur seriatim together in experience a s  external to Aristotle's 
organism; so for him the egg implied the bird. 
for the bird. 
before your neural activity is such that the sound *Kau" causes you to  
anticipate the cow - not necessarily as existing beyond you, as the thing, 
but the idea of that thing will be there for you. 
mean the cow. 
purely intentional. Representation by bringing together entities origi- 
nally separate in space and time has, in anticipation, made it possible 
for one thing to  stand for another regardless of space and time. 
the significant relation of symbols called intention, 
The egg w a s  the symbol 
If I say "Kau" to you and point at a COW, it will  not be long 
The sound "Kau" will  
The relation of the sound to  the animal wil l  have become 
This is 
TREND. The evolution of the nervous system is toward more spe- 
cific and diversified differential elements of experience of the eidetic 
type together with diversification and facilitation of anticipatory reactions 
of the intentional type. 
MATTERING 
TO WHOM IT MATTERS. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny in the 
He stood in the front of his cage and raised his person of the elephant, 
trunk as  I approached. I did not give him anything, others had. He 
swung his trunk slowly down and up to his mouth as if he had received 
food and then back t o  the original position as i f  to receive. This is a 
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gesizrc learnt by k i r A  in his lifetime. 
receiving and conveying food to his mouth. 
approached. 
This anticipatory activity served a new end. It had become a successful 
mode of begging. It was repeated whenever he was approached and when 
it was successful was repeated, serving its original end. Such gestures 
a re  one origin of language, serving to convey the idea of the anticipatory 
nervous activity t o  an organism other than that in which it occurred. But 
such gestures a re  still ambiguous. 
the gesture was effective and the change brought about beyond him affected 
him by contributing reenforcement to the process underway. 
no reason to believe that he knew how it worked. 
knows that the elephant desires food; but not the elephant, that this is 
why he receives it. The gesture symbolizes the neural activity of the 
elephant for the man but not for the elephant. 
The rmtion is simply that of 
The gesture occurred a s  I 
He had received no food but the trunk swung to the mouth. 
The elephant behaved as he did because 
But this is 
The man who feeds him 
EMOTION. A dog howls. This in itself is not a particularly efficient 
Originally little more than a forced expiration, way of getting things done. 
it has become biologically important in attracting others of his kind when 
he needs assistance. 
cient to produce forced expiration. 
which, in turn, adds impulses t o  his neural process then underway. There 
was some idea, let u s  suppose the pang of hunger, present in him at that 
time. Its neural correlate received a component from audition. There 
is every reason to expect the howling to  continue at least a s  long a s  the 
pangs a re  present, though stimuli of the type from which they originated 
have ceased. Actions of this  kind constitute emotion in a s  much a s  they 
exhibit this tendency to selhontinuation, making them difficult to control. 
Originally he howls when there a re  stimuli suffi- 
But the act itself produces a sound 
FEELING. The ideas associated with emotions a re  of the type usually 
They vary from those of great specificity, such called feelings (pathos). 
as hunger pangs, to the most general sense of well or iU being. 
always have neural components derived from enterceptors and, con- 
sequently, these feelings may be referred to the organism as  i& feeling 
of itself. 
They 
SYMPATHY. The whelp howls and the bitch hears it. She herself 
has howled in the pangs of hunger; the nowlings of her pup transmits t o  
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her ear ,  and thence to her nervous system, disturbances whose pattern is 
such as  to  arouse in her that neural activity whose idea is the hunger 
pang. 
bitch. She feels as  the pup feels. This is sympathy. It exhibits the 
material relation from mind to mind. 
But the example yields more than this. 
proceeding from the thing there and then in experience for that bitch. The 
howling, the whelp and the pang in the bitch occur together in experience 
for that bitch and her reaction is determined by all of these together. 
Under normal circumstances there is present also a distension of her 
mammary glands with its covariant impulses and the corresponding 
feelings. Among other responses she suckles her whelp. The howling 
ceases and she is relieved of the pangs of distension and of the sympa- 
thetic pangs of hunger. A l l  this is now phylogenetically determined for 
the individual and consequently facile. 
tempted to state, that she made the proper reference of the hunger pang 
to  the pup. We a re  dealing a s  usual with 
the ambiguous state. 
thing in her experience, though the pup has. 
pang seems a quality. 
has been no separation for her. 
The biological efficiency of the howl lies in this, that it 
has procured the food for the young by means of sympathy. It is affective 
with respect to the bitch; for it aroused feeling in her, whereas  feelings 
a r e  just those ideas which normally ar ise  from the disturbances initiated 
in enteroceptors; that is ,  we are dealing here with the process which, 
when the organism has distinguished itself a s  a thing, makes it realize 
that other things matter to it, in as  much as it feels itself changed by 
them. 
Thus the idea of (the feeling of) the whelp is transmitted to the 
IMPORT. The howling is 
Of a normal dog one might be 
But this is not necessarily so. 
The bitch may never have become for herself a 
Of the howling pup, her 
There is no true reference by her because there 
AFFECT. 
UNANIMITY. When one hound bays at  the moon, others begin to  bay. 
These have heard the first; when they had bayed at the moon they had 
heard themselves baying and this stimulation had augmented the original 
process. 
lation for baying. 
bayed first. 
Now the hearing of baying itself had become sufficient stimu- 
Their behavior became a replica of the hound who 
T h q  had bayed at the moon and the moon had its neural 
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representation in t h e m .  
time of this baying only one need have seen it. 
neural processes of all. 
baying, constitutes unanimity in common action which plays s o  large a 
part even in human behavior. 
and sympathetic and the identity of the idea for all members of the crowd 
is ensured only in s o  far as their experiences of objects beyond themselves 
have been identical. 
seem to resemble it. 
IMITATION. 
Thus they a l l  bayed at the moon, though at the 
The idea is there in the 
This unity of idea, present during the conjoined 
Such expressions a r e  essentially emotional 
This is not imitation no natter how closely it may 
There a re  many species of birds which have songs of 
their own completely determined for the individual phylogenetically. 
There a re  other species which have characteristic songs of their own 
but which, when the young a re  reared in the nests of other birds, exhibit 
a capacity for singing the songs of foster parents. Still other species 
a re  so prone to acquire the songs of others that they seem to have none 
of their own. And last; there are some, notably parrots, whose vocal 
productions resemble those of animals other than birds, reproducing 
sounds a s  complex a s  those of human speech. 
characteristic of other animals is a form of imitation, 
show how imitations arise. It is obvious that, with respect to it, some 
birds a re  in the ambiguous state. In others mimicry has developed 
apparently a s  an end in itself; whereas, in the complicated flights of 
starlings and crows its use in directing group activity is well  known. 
What is requisite is that the bird, to  mimic, should have a tendency to 
produce sound rather than some particular sound; that he produce sounds 
and that their occurrence occasion the continuance of his activity; that 
he hear sounds other than his own which determine specific ideas for him; 
and that, when he produced sounds, those which intensified the neural 
activity determined by audition of alien sounds become, by that reenforce- 
ment, the characteristic mode of response. 
essentially new of the nervous system, anly greater differentiation of 
structure with preservation of integrity. 
production of sounds; bodily postures and motions a r e  frequently repro- 
duced. 
by organs primarily associated with others. 
The reproductiisn of sounds 
remains to  
Again, this requires nothing 
Mimicry is not limited to  the 
These demonstrate pattern perceived by one senser reproduced 
Modeling, painting and 
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dra-wing of things seen a re  explainable in the same way. 
the ideographic elements in language. 
From these arise 
HISTRIONIC SYMPATHY. Now mimicry of this type does not neces- 
sarily imply sympathy. The organism in addition to the idea of that which 
he mimics may, or  may not, feel a s  he would i f  he were it. 
of pantomime he probably does, but when he paints a t ree  he probably 
does not. 
for some other organism the idea of the original and he may respond to it 
as he did to the original. 
or observer, it would be in kind to the other in so  far a s  they were simi- 
lar.  
TVT a r i e t y . 
In the case 
If the imitation be at all adequate t o  the original, it may exhibit 
If the original was affective to either imitator 
Sympathy may thus appear of a secondary, rather than a primary, 
EMPATHY. Such sympathy must be distinguished from empathy, which 
is the feeling arising in imitating whether o r  not it is that of the imitated. 
Where the object in question is a work of art ,  say, a statue, the beholder, 
in his partial imitation, experiences empathy with respect to the statue; 
the feeling itself may be the same as  that aroused in the sculptor; thus, 
empathy, with respect to  the statue, may be sympathy, with respect to 
the sculptor. The affective side is never entirely lost, 
MINDING 
INDICATIVE GESTURE. When the leading hound opens cry and begins 
to  give chase, the whole pack goes into action. 
the chase in mind is an example of unanimity in action- but it is more than 
this. 
the leader toward the prey. The action of the leader is an indicative 
gesture, directing the pack toward the prey. The pointer and setter 
a r e  so called because their characteristic postures a re  indicative 
gestures recognized as such by the hunter. 
t o  the name index finger. 
imperative mode and the demonstrative pronouns, this and that. 
That it goes into action with 
The action is directed by the orientation and direction of motion of 
The same use has given r i se  
The corresponding cries gave rise to the old 
ORIGIN OF INTELLECT. All indicative gestures, from the most 
primitive to the most elaborate and refined, even sample and example, 
preserve in demonstration their  hortatory value. They are  affective to 
the percipient, compelling him (by imitation) to attend t o  that to which the 
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gesture points. 
than on the affective aspect of the observed gesture. 
look at that which is indicated. No new principle is exemplified in the 
origin of indicative gestures - though in them, for the first time, intention 
becomes explicit. 
critique of the intellectual type. 
But the attention is focussed on the thing i-ntended rather 
He feels that he must 
The separation of affect and idea is the beginning of 
IDEA OF INTENDED - AFFECT TO INTENDING. For the observer 
of an indicative gesture it is possible to  distinguish and relate symbolic 
activity of the symbolizer to the thing given symbolically in that behavior. 
But what happens in the observer is more important than this. 
first time the affect is that t o  intending; whereas, the idea is that of the 
intended; the idea of intending arises a s  an entity separate from the 
intend e d . 
For the 
THINKING. That integrative process of the nervous system, in which 
the relata a re  ideas of entities intended and the relating is intending, is 
called thinking. 
Acts  of this type exhibit intending a s  the characteristic psychic 
activity of the thinker. 
Jackson has correctly coined the word pro-posit-ion-al-iz-ing. 
indicative gestures representing it a r e  called propositions because they 
stand for what they a re  not - except by intention. 
Thinking so  defined is that for  which Hughlings 
Complex 
LANGUAGE. Human language exemplifies this in a complicated form. 
Historically, it shows the development of ideograms from pictures, and 
of spoken words from natural outcries, and of imitations associated with 
indicative gestures, and lastly, the representation of these by means of 
ideograms. 
t o  which no, or many, sounds correspond. 
But this last is not complete and there exist many ideograms 
GRAMMAR. It would be  useless to trace here in detail how language 
evolved to  exhibit grammar as an analysis of speech, into relations and 
the related parts of speech, in  a proposition. 
ested to show the origin of categories. as  determined by the nature of 
thinking itself, it is necessary for us to study propositions grammatically, 
but only sufficient to do so  as long as  we remember the intentional relation 
of the proposition to that of which it is the proposition. 
ds such only in those concrete propositions of experience that a r e  composed 
In as much a s  we a re  inter- 
This is apparent 
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of three terms; as, "I saw him die," "1 saw that he was dead," "I wish 
that he were here" in the last of which intention is explicit in the conjunc- 
tion "that," but implicit in the other two. 
tion, such a s  "the dog bit the man," is meaningless apart from its relation 
to that which is intended by the intender of whom it is the intention. 
the conjunctions of propositions of the factual type, whether explicit in 
particular words or  implicit in the juxtaposition of propositions conveyed 
by change in the mood of the verb, or suggested only in the totality of that 
experience in which the proposer, proposition and proposed a re  given, 
signify intention - which is just that relation. The factual proposition 
stands for an entity in experience. As such it presents a concreteness 
greater than that signified by any of its parts, though not as  great a s  is 
exhibited in those expressions, in which factual propositions a re  con- 
joined so a s  to  include intention. Nouns a re  the names of those things 
which they represent (by intention) in the propositions in which they occur; 
things a re  next in order of concreteness to  facts. 
nouns a re  related by verbs, the most primitive of which are  transitive, 
implying that activity initiated in the thmg signified by the noun, called 
the grammatical subject, eventuated in activity in the thing signified by 
the noun, called the grammatical object. As such verbs always carry 
with them the notion of paseing from one entity to another, however these 
entities may be qualified. These verbs, a s  such, symbolize the i r re-  
versible changing of experience. 
bility time itself is distinguished, the time relation appears in the tense 
of the verb. 
and part, called extension, but spatial relations, as  such, appear first in 
the primitive preposition. 
prepositions receive temporal significance. AdJectives, and all adjectival 
expressions qualifying any part of speech, signify that there and then in 
experience some idea existed. 
The ordinary factual proposi- 
Thus 
In factual propositions 
Presumably because by this irreversi-  
Space, like time, is a derivative from the relation of whole 
Only late in the development of language do these 
CATEGORIES. Categories w i se  in the attempt to analyze experience 
in terms of experiencing. 
They a re  those entities in terms of which experience can be proposition- - 
alized. Here  the ontological difficulty appears, because the experience 
of propositionalizing is necessarily included in the totality of experience. 
Categories a re  not classes of experience. 
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Presumably for this reason all schemes of categories seem unsatisfactory. 
Aristotle began with a large number and no apparent scheme, but there 
is apparent a drift  toward those entities symbolized in speech by the gram- 
matical parts of speech; that is ,  the analysis of experience by proposL 
tionalizing was naturally attempted in terms of analysis of the proposition. 
It might have progressed further in this direction had it not been for the 
complexity of Greek verbs and the appearance of entities which were sub- 
stantives only by virtue of the metabasis. 
EVOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE. Our whole dis- 
cussion has been an analysis of experience in which the analytical elements 
exhibited various degrees of concreteness from that of the totality of exper- 
ience - through that of related facts - to that of related things constituting 
the fact. W e  have subsumed passage, extension, idea, intention; but w e  
have also subsumed the thing, as requisite for the description of the fact. 
If all we desired to do was to  describe the fact, the subsistence of these 
would suffice. 
postulate that that which is common to all cannot be one of them, it is 
adequate in so far  a s  w e  a re  concerned with the intentional relation of ideas 
as predicable of things. 
Related facts do constitute the totality of experience. Their relation 
transcends the domain of logic at the time, in the place, of the actual 
metabasis. 
exhibition of a variety of ideas distributed hither and yon in particular pat- 
terns, but with essential novelty. The creature is a new timeless entity- 
a new idea which, a s  soon a s  it has been created, must obey the laws of 
logic. 
exist. 
do not contain themselves a s  members. 
deceptive, for the entity defined cannot arise. 
not logical. 
inwhichthe metabasisis in process of occurring; the problem was ontolog-. 
ical, not logical; for logic is a law relating created ideas, whereas ontology 
is the law of the creation of entities. 
entities which, taken together as relata and relation, constitute mind - 
just a s  passage and extension constitute matter'.> Logic is: the - 
To them the Aristotelian logic is applicable and, with the 
But the relation of facts transcends such a scheme. 
Here we a r e  concerned with creation, not in the sense of the 
It frequently happens that entities a r e  "definable"' which cannot 
Of these the classic example is the class of all those classes which 
In such cases the definition is 
The fallacy is ontological, 
As in the ambiguous state, we have described those organisms 
Ideas and intentions a re  mental 
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once-for-all-relation of mental entities. 
cannot be understood except in terms of its creation. 
A s  such it may be known but it 
UNDERSTANDING. When we attempt to describe aitia (translated 
causes) and things we attempt to  find some name applicable to them all. 
This is because we understand them ontogenetically; that is, a s  arising 
by a particular mode of analysis of the concrete (fact) a s  relata and rela- 
tion and a s  relation and relata by the alternative mode of analysis. It is 
entities s o  conceived, a s  transcending relata and relation, which exhibit 
themselves in the metabasis eis all0 genos, now in one category, now in 
another. Ideas a re  necessarily adjectival, passage verbal, extension 
prepositional, intention conjunctural, though by virtue of the metabasis 
it is possible for us to substantialize them. But entities so substantial- 
ized a re  not things, though they appear a s  nouns in prepositions. If the 
original entity is mental, that which intended remains mental; the only 
passage and extension (matter) which it possesses a re  of, and in, the 
propositionalizing and the proposition. And here the propositionalizing 
is ontic when the proposition exhibits a novel idea. It is creative thinking 
when the novel idea is not illusive but submits to the logos. 
discussion mundane; this distinguishes understanding and creative thinking 
from memorizing and the application of rules, that the laws of the first 
a re  ontological and, of the second, logical. 
To keep the 
THE EVOLUTION OF LOGIC. That science should start with the 
s t a r s  and end with man- that logic should start  with the copulative and 
end with verbs of sentiment - suggests that the s tars  and the copulative 
could be viewed more dispassionately; for relations less  affective per- 
mit a restriction of the affect to intending, so sacrificing importance for 
clarity. To say, "the moon is white" probably required centuries of 
intuitive abstraction after man had learnt to say, "I  love you." Quite the 
reverse is true of their logical analysis. Logic has been largely restricted 
to the mental relations of mental entities, propositions have not. 
sequently, logic h=ls been found applicable to a restricted group of prop- 
ositions. The simple proposition, composed of two terms and the 
copulative, together with certain modifications, such as  all o r  some, no, 
not and none, considered by Aristotle were the only propositions submitting 
to logic until the d a ~ s  f Eoole who qzantified the second te rn ,  or predicate. 
Con- 
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Not until the beginning of this century were relations other than those 
represented by the copulative considered. 
groups, a s  symetrical, reflexive and transitive and these in turn sub- 
divided. 
rapidly by the logic of propositional functions, or propositions neither 
true nor false, but capable of being transformed into propositions, true 
or false, by a loss of universality through restriction to  specific entities. 
Such developments were necessitated by the attempt to reduce mathematics 
to  logical formulations. 
true or false, as  opposed to  whether it is consistent with the rest of 
mathematics, is to ask whether o r  not it conforms to  the fact of our 
experience of things. 
Now, "the moont1 is a thing to  which men, being organisms, react neu- 
rally. 
to the snow, to sea foam and to  the proposition, stands for a U g  to which 
"is white" is adjectival. Logic has not been concerned with whether or not 
the proposition corresponded to experience (with "matters of fad'). It 
has handled the proposition, "the moon is white," a s  though ,the moon" 
were a mental entity of the same kind a s  "white." This was justified only 
in so  far a s  both were regarded as ideas, substantialized only in the prop- 
osition. "Socrates is a man" (minor premise), and "all men a r e  mortals" 
(major premise), therefore "Socrates is mortal" (conclusion), implies a 
metabasis concealed behind the relation of all and some. 
adjectival to "Socrates," just in so f a r  a s  we a re  dealing with Socrates 
who began as  a zygote to end as  a corpse, for we deduce from "man," 
as here used, that Socrates was mortal. The idea {Platonic idea, 
Whiteheadean object) is obviously not mortal: 
not mortal. 
refers to things, to all of which "a re  mrtals" is adjectival. 
sents a change of the middle term ("men") from an adjectival entity to  that 
entity substantialized. 
genos. "The moon" is an entity and 'Iwhite" is an entity; and the metabasis, 
always in use without recognition, confused the logician, to whom it seemed 
a matter of some and all. 
and all such syllogisms a re  cases in point - conceals the thiriking in 
These were divided into major 
This was a great emancipation for the logician and was followed 
To ask whether a mathematical proposition is 
It is like asking whether or not the moon is white. 
A particular pattern of neural response corresponds to the moon, 
'Is a man" is 
'Socrates," qua idea, is 
But in the major premise, "all men a re  mortal," "men" 
This repre- 
Thus, it is an example of the metabasis eis all0 
Every predication concerning a predicable- 
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expressing the thought. (For the thin-king usually progresses from the 
minor to the major premise and thence, to the conclusion; but formal 
logic from the major, to the minor, and so, to  the conclusion.) But this 
concealed thinking is that which is responsible for that inward click of 
certainty in the conclusion (which seems to  be our self-reflexive deja-vu; 
perhaps the type of neural reenforcement which ar ises  most clearly for 
us when our anticipatory reactions, having gone right, a r e  reenforced in 
the fact). 
It might seem that in mathematics, in a s  much a s  it is the theme of 
themes, in which all of these entities which a re  intended a re  the ideas of 
foregone intendings, no metabasis was requisite. 
case, is shown by the example, two Ones equal one m o .  Mathematical 
reasoning is thinking, not always merely the application of rules, but fre- 
quently creative thinking. This is evidenced by the new themes it has 
produced. 
process is responsible in large measure for the origin of the logic of 
system-function; but this, as  all varieties of logic, so far considered, 
concerns itself with c r e a m  entities rather than with their oreatioa It 
is an abstract science rather than a science of abstraction. 
That such is not the 
These in turn have submitted to  logical analysis and this 
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND 
FACT. A s  physicists had to  have an ether to transmit waves, because 
mathematical equations of wave form related observations correctly, so  
Plato, noting the appearance of new ideas (new eternal forms), supposed 
them to have "endured' in the 'Sun.' We have tried t o  show how novel 
ideas arise from the neural activity of those for whom they appear in the 
creative advance of the world- In order to  do so, we have made use of the 
alternative modes of analysis together with subsequent synthesis. 
possibility of such a neural activity is proved by our having done so. That 
is a matter of fzct. 
OTHER LIMITATIONS. Facts do submit to aUernative.modes of 
The 
analysis. 
relata or relation a r e  given. W e  cannot change the past. 
But ou r  experience of the world exhibits another changelessness which 
They are  given in a sense more concrete than tha3 in which 
Ii is past, fact. 
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like facts, cannot be altered, but may be disregarded. 
tinguished from the laws of science, in that the laws of science a r e  dis- 
coverable within the given fact. 
given, immediately, as  restrictions of possibility comparable to that 
concerning the past. This type of givenness is rather prerequisite fo r  
all experience than for particular sequences, or arrangements, within 
experience. The particular facts a r e  susceptible of alternative modes 
of analysis; but this, a s  a limitation of possibilities of experience, is 
too concrete for u s  to transubstantiate the correlative relations of them 
into relata. It may be that experience does not submit t o  the alternative 
mode of analysis. It is enough for our purpose that facts do. Our con- 
cern is with the logical structure of mind rather than with the sublimity 
of such a limitation. 
It is to be dis- 
That I1I am 1" and "You a re  you" a r e  
REFERENCE O F  MIND TO MATTER. Mind is not a thing. A mind 
does not occupy space through time. A brain does. It is theoretically 
possible for two men to be of one mind; not- of one brain, Such con- 
creteness a s  is attributed to  a given mind is done so in the metabasis or 
by reference of the mind in question to a singular, particular matter, 
the body. Let us consider a physicist making an observation. He is 
concerned with the passage and extension of the observed. H e  refers  idea 
and intention to it with great exactitude. 
reaches the number 23, that means to him that the water is at that tem- 
perature, or the gas at that pressure, or the potential that many volts, 
according to the passage and extension involved in his experiment. But 
he attempts to neglect idea and intention a s  of the observed and restricts 
his symbols, as  far as  possible, to  refer to passage and extension a s  
such. 
he would consider a purely mental affair; that is, the mathematical 
relating of ideas and intentions. The result is an hiatus, apparent but 
not real, between the observation and the mathematics. In both cases, 
he and the entities with which he was concerned were mental and mate- 
rial. They were concrete in experience, but by a shift in attention he 
was able to abstract either aspect and neglect momentarilly the other. 
For him this  process has usually been successful, though there a re  
instames, like that of the ether, in which he has supposed concreteness 
When the pointer on the dial 
The idea and intention were his own. But he then indulges in what 
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without wxrnnt .  The theory of relativity, with its experimental veri- 
fication, has brought t o  light several such fallacies of misplaced con- 
creteness. When we turn to the mathematical ,procedures of the 
mathematicians themselves we find that they tend t o  neglect the passage 
and extension of their own brains, or  at least to pay insufficient attention 
to them, as  is witnessed by the r ise  of the intuitionalistic school of 
Brouwer and Weyl. They a re  definitely concerned with thinking about 
the same entity in  two ways at once, but refer the concreteness t o  the 
universe of discourse as the continuum which is both all and some, and 
whole and part; that is, they suppose that which is given intuitively to 
be both mental and material. 
MATHEMATICS AS LOGIC. Mathematics, aside from this intuition 
which is Tpprently the metabasis, is essentially logic in origin and 
specific symbology, adding t o  logic premises productive of relations of 
increasing complexity. 
different from logic seems to  have arisen because mathematics attributed 
to entities, which had undergone metabasis, concreteness comparable to 
that of the entities from which mathematical entities were originally 
abstracted. 
That mathematics is thought t o  be essentially 
LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND IN MINDING. Ideally, the phys- 
icist regards himself as affected during the period of observation; tnat 
is, it matters to him. Ideally, he regards himself as  minding it later, 
during his mathematical period. It is during this later period that the 
characteristically "psychic processes" dominate the organism (the phys- 
icist); it is at this time that actpsychology, a s  phenomenology, would 
form the significant analysis. His  mind, so  conceived, would show a 
relatively oovious s;.stern of intentions. 
those of previous intentions. 
o r  bracket the contribution of the external world. 
recollection of his sensations would be of little more significance and 
would appear illusory affairs. 
mind would be most apparent to  him. 
The ideas tiiernselves would be 
It would be legitimate to  ignore, minimize 
His feelings and the 
At this time the logical structure of his 
LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND IN MATTERING. It is the fond 
hope of the physicist that, during the observational period, all psychic 
processes, other than those determined in him by the e n e r a  received 
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from the apparatus, a re  held in abeyance. He would like to look upon 
himself as  a tabula rasa on which the observed phenomenon inscribed 
itself; but this is forever precluded by his anticipatory reactions requi- 
site for the question he has put to nature. 
called observation, is not one in which the observed is alone effective in 
the observer, but one in which it is affective to the observer. 
ience is such a s  to reenforce, or fail to reenforce, anticipatory neural 
activities already under way. 
osfionaltype is apparent explicitdy in the use of such terms a s  indicator, 
pointer, dial. Idea and intention cannot be excluded - for observation 
itself has its psychic aspect. The logic for handling the mathematical 
propositions is already extant, but that for handling the simplest propo- 
sitions of the observxtional sciences is still to seek. 
"I see green,""it hurt me," 
The particular experience, 
The exper- 
That these, themselves, a r e  of the prop- 
LOGIC OF FACTUAL PROPOSITIONS. 
"the dog bit the man" a re  propositions of this  type in which the verb is 
transitive. These propositions are factual; they a re  not predications 
concerning the subject but stand for the facts themselves. Combinations 
of these do not yield syllogisms by predication of predicables. In a cer- 
tain sense all observational sciences, in so  far as they approach the form- 
ulation of laws governing the relation of such proposed entities, a r e  
preparing the way far  the logic of factual verbs; but, in another sense, 
the relation of such propositions is predetermined by the mere givenness 
of fact. This givenness is of the once-for-all type. It is ,  however, such 
that the problem of truth can never be elrcluded a s  it can in the familiar 
varieties of logic. These propositions a re  relatively concrete; there is 
another group, equally concrete, of complexity equivalent to that of prop- 
ositional functions. We refer t o  those of sentiment: 'I1 lave him," "I 
obey him," "I like it"; and still another group more complex in form; "I 
believe that he wil l  die," "I hope that he wil l  live," 'I1 know that it killed 
him," " I  spoke that you might know that it was true,n in which relation of 
sub- and superordination appears, for which reason these latter a re  more 
closely related to  the entities considered in the logic of system functions. 
Our habit of drawing conclusions from these concrete propositions, singly 
or in combinations, yields anticipatory activities confirmed in subsequent 
experience. Inasmuch as  the propositions a re  true, we can and do reason 
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correctly by means of them. The processes a re  habitual. 
implicit a once-for-allness of those intentional relata; in other words, 
there exists the possibility of a formal logic applicable to them. 
Let us  consider the proposition "I see a 
purple cow." It may, or may not, be true. To say that it is true means 
that it proposes an actual experience, for the proposition is factual. 
us  suppose it true. 
one (I) to  whom the cow was purple. Purple is an idea. It is adjectival 
t o  the cow for that observer. It is adverbal to  that particular portion of 
the experience (of seeing that cow) for that. observer. It is predicable, 
concerning that pattern of his neural activity, that i t  is purple for him. 
Provided we keep clear that it is for him- it would be equally proper to  
refer the mental entity purple to the cow, to the seeing or to the I of the 
speaker; whereas, for some other observer (supposing that he could 
observe the neural process, the seeing, and the cow of the first observer) 
it would be obviously erroneous for  him to expect that the neural process, 
o r  the seeing, would be purple to him, even if  the cow was. 
circumstances he would probably admit that the reference of purple to  
the cow was correct, but disagree with ita reference to the seeing or  the 
I. It is a character of factual propositions that they a re  true or  false. 
To be true they must correspond to experience and this  experience must 
be that of some experiencer; but more than this, it must correspond to  
the experience of that particular experiencer for whom we say "it is true." 
This third term, Ilfor whom," may be implicit or expressed but must 
always be considered when we deal with truth or falsity; for, in this,  we 
are concerned with the reference of mind tamat te r ,  concrete in things, 
facts and experience. 
SOLUS IPSE. 
In that is 
FOR WHOM IT IS TRUE. 
Let 
Implicit in this supposition is that there was some 
Under such 
That '1 am E" and ''you a re  you" forever precludes 
my experience from becoming your experience. 
sible for you to know what purple is for me, though you may know what is 
purple for me, 1t is not immediately apparent t o  you that you do not know 
what purple is to you, because you do know what is purple to you and because 
it is you who know. But purple is essentially adjectival to that which is 
purple to  him for  whom it is purple. To attempt to  predicate anything 6f 
"purple" requires the metabasis in which a re  implicit alternative modes 
It is inherently impos- 
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of analysis; but these a re  restricted to  an analysis of fact. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND. 
"I am I"; "You are  you." Each is a statement of fact which no alterna- 
tive modes of analysis transcend. The metabasis cannot bridge the gap. 
But here the logical character of mind reqders insig nificant the breach. 
A s  f a r  as the logical character of mind is concerned, purple is an idea 
and, a s  such, for logic is merely that particular identity signified by the 
word purple. We agree to  say of the cow: "She is purple." How this 
aas  been achieved we have shown in the passage concerning the ambiguous 
state. The word "purple," like the sound "Kau," then represents symbol- 
ically, for you and for me the idea that was there for us then. 
whether "your idea" is the same a s  "my idea" is to lose sight of the proper 
reference of mind to  matter by failing to a s k  
means to  me just that idea which was  there for me; to  you, just  that idea 
which was there for ym. An idea is an entity of which it makes no sense 
to  ask whether it is identical. Your mode of analysis of experience and 
my mode of analysis of experience, each yielded an entity of the eidetic 
type symbolized by purple and present in the  cow. For  logic that is all 
that is requisite. 
bdh symbolized by purple, is intentional- not one of identity. 
To ask 
"For  whom?" Purple 
This relation between my thought and your thought, 
IMAGINATION. The problem of image, or  of imagination, is not the 
same a s  that of the idea. 
thing. 
but it exhibits passage and extension other than that of the thing of which 
it is the image. 
it a s  intending the thing. 
used to represent the thing, in which case it exhibits anintentional relation 
to  the thing; but the intending itself is an activity of the intender. Only 
in one special case, in which the image is to  be found as a thing spatio- 
temporally within the intender, does it resemble a thought. 
An image of a thing is, in a certain sense, a 
It has its idea in common with the thing of which it is the image, 
Only in a derivative sense is it appropriate to  speak of 
It is eidetically related to that thing, It may be 
'THINKING. A thought is presumably a thing - presumably, rather 
than experimentally, because heads a re  not open for direct inspection of 
propositionalizing. 
relation to other things. 
It is related to  other things, or other entities, intentionally. 
Thought is not restricted, a s  image, to the eidetic 
It may be related to  entities which a re  not things. 
Thus thoughts 
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differ from other things in that they exhibit intention, effective in intending, 
a s  the characteristic passage from thought t o  thought. 
within the nervous system of the intender. But the Characteristic relation 
of extension, namely whole and part, is replaced, for that intender, by an 
analysis yielding intentions; s o  that any entire entity of the type of thought, 
such a s  this thesis, yields subordination and superordination of intentions 
for its author - though obviously the subordinate and superordinate rela- 
tions would be replaced for a neurologist, examining the neural process, 
by tempero=spatial parts. The intention of the entire thesis implies the 
intentions explicit in the parts. The idea of thought is intention itself. 
be a thought is to be intentional. 
This intending ocwrs 
To 
RESUME. A thought is a thing which, for the thinker and all who 
receive it, exhibits all its aitia (causes) intentionally. 
this arose by the metabasis eis all0 genos, alternative modes of analysis, 
symbolism, the representational character of neural processes, through 
the ambiguous state. 
thing - in this instance a purely neural affair within the organism - through 
the creative indicative gesture and response to it, to  lose track of the 
affect, concentrate on the idea, recognize the intention and begin to think. 
To lose track of the affect, other than that to thinking, is prerequisite to 
theory, which is the idea of systematized thought. Of this practice is the 
obverse. 
We have shown how 
In so doing we have shown how it was possible for a 
LOGIC IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. Thinking is a neural activity, 
manifest to  us  as propositions external t o  the proposer. 
one to  the other there exists a characteristic activity called speaking. 
is so  closely related to thinking, eidetically and intentionally, that the dis- 
tinction is sometimes lost; though the one is essentially theory and the 
other practice. 
a r e  given once-for-all. 
ideally restricted to symbolize these entities. 
laws of logic a re  not identical. 
To pass from 
It 
Thinking necessarily proceeds in terms of entities which 
We have shown how words become more and more 
The laws of thought and the 
CHARACTER AS EXAMPLE O F  LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF MIND. 
Logic is the law of thought in so f a r  a s  it necessarily deals with entities 
created once-for-all and symbolized by words. 
sari ly spoken; tney may be written; tney may be nothing more than 
But words a re  not neces- 
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indicative gestures. A l l  those entities which convey to u s  the character 
of a man a re  fundamentally logical, however variously they may appear. 
Understood a s  related, they exhibit that man, in so far a s  he has any 
character, a s  a specific example necessarily exhibiting the logical struc- 
ture of mind. 
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EXTRADUCTION 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END. Aristotle in describing a work of 
art  says that it consists of three parts, the last of which he calls the end. 
Of it, he says, that it requires something before it but nothing after it. 
This is the beginning of the end. , We hope that it will  be impossible to 
understand it without the rest  of the thesis, for it is supposed to be an 
organic whole containing no gratuitous parts. We have shown how the 
material and mental relations of things, in the metabasis by alternative 
modes of analysis, yielded the substantives, mind and matter. It was 
in the discussion of the organisms in the ambiguous state that we laid 
the conceptual foundations for  "minding" and llmatteringll a s  transitive 
factual verbs, symbolizing passage, limited neither to the organism a s  
the ultimate unit composed of members, nor to the organism as  the ulti- 
mate unit composing his universe. The problem cannot be stated in i ts  
fu l l  complexity without employing propositions equally complex. 
pointed out that this was possible at all only on account of the logical 
structure of mind. 
entities however complex, is the formation of propositions of the copula- 
tive two-term-type. They give a specious simplicity and suggest a clar-  
ity by concealing the complexity of the problem itself. 
is had to relations other than the copulative but of an essentially mathe- 
matical variety. 
appear. 
tions involved failed to represent the one-wayedness of the world which 
found subsidiary expression either as that "heat will not itself pass frorn 
a colder to a warmer body" or  "die Entropie der Welt strebt einem Maxi- 
mum zuItl both of which a re  factual propositions. 
atry, the logic of predication of relations, propositions and propositional 
functions, of systems and of system functions, meets the same fate a s  
in physics; but at the beginning, instead of at the end, of i ts  career. 
I-- 
- 
I 
We have 
The usual procedure, in attempting descriptions of 
Next, recourse 
Finally, propositional functions and system functions 
This worked well in the physical sciences, except that the equa- 
In the case of psychi- 
PSYCHOSIS OF MINDING AND MATTERING DISTINGUISHED: In 
psychiatry it is not possible to dispense with either variety of proposition, 
predicative or factual, and among those which are  essentually factual, 
it remains to show that those of sentiment are  frequently applicable and 
adequate, though in complex forms. 
We have shown how intellectual critique arose in the specialization 
among affects to the organism in response to the indicative gesture so 
that the activity of intending became a specialized, recognizable activity. 
Psychoses present a differentiation, always present but complete only to 
the extent to which the segregation of the affect to intending has occurred 
in the given patient, between disturbances of intellect and disturbances 
of affect. The degrees of segregation and the degree of intention a re  not 
necessarily covariant. 
a s  they present poverty of propositions characterized by paucity of ideas, 
deficiency of intentional sub- and super-ordination, and restriction of 
thoughts to images - tlthing-mindednessll - can usually be described with- 
out recourse to propositions of fact or sentiment. But, even here, the 
attempt to understand these defects requires that they be proposed in the 
f u l l  concreteness of fact i n  order to exhibit how they came into being and 
how they exhibit their practical consequences. 
affect, we must necessarily resort  to factual propositions. 
orders the entire behavior of the patient, in so f a r  a s  it can be understood 
in terms of the propositional significance of his actions, requires atten- 
tion directed primarily to his factual relation to the world. 
DEFECTIVE MINDING. In general, intellectual defects, in so far 
DEFECTIVE MATTERING. When we consider the disorders of 
In these dis- 
FORMALISTIC MISTAKE. The analysis of experience into facts, to 
which the alternative mode is apparently absent, yields the experience 
of the patient as  his own and the experience of the psychiatrist a s  his 
own. 
the chasm between these facts can be bridged in the case of mental enti- 
ties by the word a s  proposition arising from the indicative gesture. But 
it is possible to teach a parrot words that have lost their significance a s  
words. 
of the sound, not the idea of that to which the sound was intentionally 
related. 
duces what seem propositions but a r e  devoid of that propositional signi- 
ficance -&ich the examiner attributes to them. 
We have shown how, on account of the logical structure of mind, 
The parrot reproduces the sound that he hears. The idea is that 
So it happens that the mentally deficient, learning by rote, pro- 
Apart from this difficulty, 
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whjch i s  not insurmountable, it is possible to quantify and qualify intel- 
lectual defect, though a s  yet it is difficult to pursue the analysis further. 
affect is by no means easy. 
what he then did is factually inadequate. 
way within him. 
sented by overt behavior. 
indicative gestures which point at that which we cannot see. 
of truth arises. 
PROBLEM O F  VERACITY." But the problem with respect to the 
To record what was done to the patient and 
We need to know what was  undir 
His anticipatory reactions a re  not necessarily repre- 
For knowledge of them we are  dependent upon 
The problem 
STRENGTH OF ANTICIPATORY REACTIONS. When we compare 
this problem with that in which the patient is exhibiting an emotion which 
is visible to  us and to which what is then done to the patient is affective, 
it becomes at once apparent that we a re  dependent upon the veracity of 
the patient when there is no patent emotion, except in those cases in 
which what is done to the patient is sufficient to determine the response 
of the patient regardless of anticipatory reactions. Short of destruction 
no stimuli a re  universally so potent. 
held his right hand in the fire to demonstrate the strength of his antici- 
patory reactions. 
importance of a sentiment which is a propositional function involving 
anticipatory reactions. The statement of an anticipatory reaction is a 
three-termed expression of the factual type. Hence the statement of 
affect, in its complete form, is a very complicated affair and always 
involves the problem of truth. 
and therefore expected me to hurt him; so, when I held out my hand, he 
bit it!" That we reason in such a manner, no one can deny. 
"I believe," instead of "1 know," implies the problem of veracity. Ther? 
a re  always present mental entities, usually explicitly a s  well as impli- 
citly represented in such propositions. 
ulative nor limited to intention. 
the formal development of a logic of the verbs of fact and sentiment. 
Only so can we hope to  cope with minding and mattering in order to 
develop a psychology and psychiatry restricted neither to sociology nor 
to physiology. 
Laevus got his name because he 
SENTIMENT. But Laevus did more than this. He demonstrated the 
For example, "1 believe that he hated me 
The word, 
But the relations a re  not cop- 
The analysis of the psychopathia waits 
Sentiments a re  the least analytical units which can be 
6 '. 
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said to exhibit psychic properties. 
still concrete. Of them character is the logical structure without which 
In them minding and mattering are 
man is mad. I 
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